‘ACC must be freed from political and bureaucratic influence’

Dr Iftekharuzzaman, executive director of Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) and former head of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) Reform Commission, speaks to Tasneem Tayeb of The Daily Star about the state of corruption in Bangladesh, the fate of reform efforts, and the changes needed to hold those in power accountable.

ACC was established in 2004 as an independent institution to combat corruption. More than two decades later, corruption remains deeply embedded in the public sector. What was the original thinking behind the commission, and where did it fail in practice?

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The former Bureau of Anti-Corruption, which ACC replaced, was part of the government and directly under its control. Since government departments and those in power were themselves often accused of corruption, the bureau could not function effectively. It rather became an instrument for harassing political opponents. We wanted a specialised, independent institution free from government influence.

Fighting corruption, however, needs more than one institution. Parliament, the judiciary, law enforcement agencies, and the bureaucracy must also fulfil their responsibilities. Parliamentary committees, for example, are supposed to hold the government accountable, but whether they function properly remains a major question.

Moreover, since its beginning, appointments to the commission reflected partisan political choices. Its leadership favoured the ruling authorities while targeting political opponents, allowing the bureau’s culture to continue under a new identity. Bureaucratic influence compounded the problem as senior positions below the commissioners came to be dominated by deputed officials whose allegiance remained with the bureaucracy. This damaged ACC’s capacity and credibility. People saw minor offenders pursued while powerful figures escaped accountability.

We recommended limiting the number of deputed bureaucrats and addressing corruption within ACC itself. Officials implicated in corruption should be removed and handed over to the relevant law enforcement agencies.

Does this chequered history suggest that policymakers failed to understand how corruption operates in Bangladesh, or that their knowledge has not translated into action?

I would not say policymakers do not understand corruption. Having engaged with those in power over the years, I know there is a clear understanding of what corruption is, how it can be combated, and what their responsibilities are. These are documented in laws, policies, codes of conduct, and reform recommendations. What’s missing is execution, as those who are supposed to apply this knowledge are often beneficiaries of corruption themselves. They protect the system and thus enable further corruption.

Ironically, fighting corruption has become central to political rhetoric. Election manifestos or government statements are full of commitments. The current ruling party’s 31-point agenda, election manifesto, and the July Charter, which its leaders have pledged to implement word for word, also contain specific commitments against corruption. So political will exists on paper, but it is not reflected in practice.

TIB’s household surveys have found that 85 percent of respondents who paid bribes said they would not have received their service otherwise. This shows how deeply systemic corruption is. Catching individual offenders cannot solve the problem while the wider system remains unchanged. Expectations naturally focus on ACC as the institution specifically mandated to fight corruption, but other institutions responsible for strengthening the state’s capacity to control corruption have also failed to fulfil their roles.

To be clear, corruption does not mean just bribery. It involves the abuse of power for private gain often through collusion among political actors, public officials, and business interests. So to tackle it, we must dismantle the wider ecosystem that allows such practices to persist.

The government has recently decided to set up separate anti-corruption committees in every ministry. What gaps could these committees fill when the existing mechanisms have failed to ensure accountability?

I think this may turn out to be another example of rhetoric as the government is not approaching the problem strategically. In Bangladesh, committees are often formed to deflect attention from key issues, while their reports remain unpublished and their effectiveness is rarely evident. Their work is also likely to be hampered by conflicts of interest. As things stand, the most senior officials in each ministry already have responsibilities for ensuring accountability, integrity, and corruption-free administration. There is, moreover, no clear indication of what these new committees will actually do.

Speaking of strategic interventions, we recommended a national anti-corruption strategy assigning specific responsibilities to the institutions concerned. The government has yet to act on this proposal, even though the ruling party, like other political parties, fully endorsed it. The idea is to transform the existing National Integrity Strategy into a national anti-corruption strategy. But these committees, representing an ad hoc approach, may, at best, recommend transferring a corrupt official from one ministry or department to another. Such departmental action has already proved ineffective and could become another way of protecting corrupt officials by simply shifting them around.

Higher salaries are often presented as a way to curb corruption in the public sector. How can the new pay scale help achieve this when previous increases have failed to do so?

Public officials are a fixed-income group, so we cannot expect them to perform to the best of their ability and with integrity unless their salaries and benefits are commensurate with the cost of living. Reviewing salaries periodically is also a standard practice. That said, better pay must be linked to accountability. We recommended making annual public disclosure of assets and income a condition for receiving the revised pay scale. Officials agreeing to disclose their assets and update their statements annually would receive the increase, while those unwilling to do so would not. The purpose was to make the salary revision an effective tool for controlling corruption.

But the proposal was not accepted because of resistance from bureaucrats. Without accountability, I fear that higher salaries could simply lead to demands for higher bribes rather than help curb corruption.

The interim government established reform commissions but left many of their recommendations unimplemented. Where did it fall short, particularly in relation to the ACC reforms you proposed?

Forming the commissions was a positive step, but the interim government lacked a clear vision for what to do with their reports. It committed to implementing the recommendations that could be acted upon immediately through executive authority or by the relevant institutions, without needing to wait for a new government or constitutional changes. But most recommendations were left aside, apart from a few selected on an ad hoc basis as a token gesture. Where legal changes were made, they often reflected the government’s own ideas rather than the commissions’ recommendations. The ACC ordinance left out critical recommendations of the ACC Reform Commission.

We wanted ACC to have full independence alongside accountability. Independence cannot mean the absence of accountability. ACC must answer for protecting those in power or harassing political opponents. Our proposed reforms sought to address both political influence and bureaucratic control, but those critical changes remain unimplemented. The promise that cabinet members and public officials would disclose their wealth statements was also delayed until shortly before the interim government stepped down. What was eventually disclosed was controversial, to say the least. These examples raise questions about the seriousness of the interim government’s commitment to transparency and the foundation it left for reform.

What should the current government prioritise to give substance to its commitments against corruption?

It must abandon the mindset that “it is now our turn” and the winner-takes-all politics: the idea that we have been deprived of opportunities for so long, so winning the election entitles us to capture everything. Political positions, elected or unelected, within parties or the government, are unfortunately being treated as a licence for profiteering and personal gain. After the former regime fell on August 5, 2024, the space it had occupied through extortion and corruption was taken over by those who emerged as victors. This continued under the interim government and persists today.

This political culture, in which the abuse of power simply changes hands, must end. Political commitment must be demonstrated by enabling institutions to hold those in power to account. People must also be able to reject and report corruption without facing retaliation. Harassing those who expose corruption while protecting the corrupt only allows it to flourish.

Four elements must work in concert—political commitment, the capacity to hold offenders accountable, independent and effective institutions, and people’s ability to stand against corruption. If any of these is missing, the system cannot deliver what is promised.

If you could begin making changes now, what would be your first priority, and what results would convince people that accountability is finally possible?

There is no single magic bullet for fighting corruption. My first priority nevertheless would be to create the conditions for the governing authorities to address the two major drivers of unabated corruption: cleansing the ruling party of corruption at all levels and overhauling a bureaucracy that has become deeply entrenched in preserving systemic corruption. The first step to that end would be to require public officials to disclose their annually updated assets for public scrutiny. Equally important is a truly independent, corruption-free, efficient, and accountable ACC. The recommendations are already there on how to make it effective. Its ability to function properly depends on the government allowing it to exercise its mandate without partisan influence or bureaucratic control.

We need to see corruption, especially at higher levels, punished. The commission has hundreds of cases; it cannot, nor does it need to, handle all of them at once. Prioritising high-profile cases and securing exemplary punishments in, say, even 10 cases a year could send a powerful signal to society.

ACC cannot deliver this alone. It needs, among other things, a truly independent judicial system that upholds the highest standards of integrity. Fighting corruption needs a comprehensive strategy combining both prevention and control and involving the whole of the state and society.

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