Confrontation in Sri Lanka

It was clear for some time that President Chandrika Kumaratunge was contemplating action. She was feeling uneasy over the talks that Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe's government was conducting with the Tamil Tigers (LTTE). She had made her annoyance public more than once. Her understanding was that while the government had made all concessions, the LTTE had not retreated a bit.

That was true. Still the decision to suspend parliament when the Prime Minister was away to America was an indiscreet and rash step. The imposition of the emergency was worse. The President could have waited for Wickremasinghe's return. His annoyance was justified. I wonder whether she talked to him on the phone before taking the step. She was, no doubt, within her constitutional authority to do what she did. But she went against the wishes of people who had given Wickremasinghe a majority in parliament on the plank of peace. However, those who are talking in terms of the President's impeachment are only aggravating the situation when all of them should be united.

Tap here to add The Daily Star as a trusted source

That Chandrika wanted India to play a role was clear from her two visits to Delhi in the last few months. Apparently, New Delhi was not willing to come to the fore. It was probably scared to entangle itself with yet another terrorist organisation. Sensing India's reluctance, Chandrika talked to the opposition leaders, experts and journalists in Delhi to seek their support. I was present at one of the sittings where she complained that the LTTE was making a fool of Wickremasinghe's government. She made no bones about her unhappiness about the unilateral concessions given to the LTTE. She accused the prime minister of giving it time to consolidate its position, train new cadres and procure weapons. She did not like the LTTE's complete control over the northeast where its supporters lived and from where their leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran operated.

When I visited Colombo earlier this year I could detect the hiatus between the President and the Prime Minister. She felt he had gone too far. The prime minister's predicament was that people had developed a vested interest in peace and had no heart in resuming hostilities. As his minister and chief negotiator GL Pieris told me then, "it takes time for a militant organisation to change itself in a political party." I wonder if his assessment about the LTTE has turned out to be correct.

I wish India had taken more active part. The LTTE could dupe Norway which brokered peace, but not New Delhi which was familiar with Prabhakaran's ways. Not long ago, when I asked Foreign Minister Yaswant Sinha why India was not taking more interest than it should, he said: "We know what is happening. Norway consults us all the time. We shall come into the picture when we think it is appropriate." India's High Commissioner to Sri Lanka was more realistic. He had no doubts about the LTTE's intention to gain time and build its military prowess. Obviously, his voice was not heard in the mindset of Foreign Office at Delhi.

That New Delhi waited for too long is obvious. The Sri Lankan prime minister went to Washington and got an assurance for support on his peace process. Why New Delhi did not come out openly on his side is sheer misunderstanding of the situation. Wickremasinghe came to Delhi before he travelled to America. Whatever this means, the proposals made by the LTTE are disappointing. They are Eelam in content, if not in name. The demand for an "interim self-governing authority for the northeast of the island of Sri Lanka" covers all aspects of governance. Chandrika's fears have been proved right.

In the proposals made by the LTTE, there is not even a remote reference to federalism which alone can be the basis for any solution in Sri Lanka and which the LTTE seems to have accepted at one time. If the proposals were accepted in to, they would tantamount to creating a separate, independent state. The proposals give everything to the LTTE, including law and order and powers to raise tax and revenue. The Sri Lankan government does not come into the picture anywhere. Nor does Colombo have any overall authority in the northeast.

I fail to understand why the Wickremasinghe government is still not coming out vehemently against the proposals. Its reaction that the LTTE document "differes in fundamental aspect" is too mild and suggests a state of mind which wants to buy peace at any cost. The Prime Minister's remark from America that peace process will not be allowed to be thwarted is not realistic. Where is the process? It is only the LTTE which dictates. Any sign of surrender can have a bad effect on the army which can prove dangerous in the circumstances.

India's comment that it hoped there would be no adverse impact on the ongoing peace process in Sri Lanka is far from facing the facts. The talks can have little meaning if the LTTE is not willing to recognise Colombo as the authority superior to it. Sri Lanka's unity is at stake. New Delhi also forgets the repercussions which the LTTE's independent territory in the northeast can have. Tamil Nadu is only next-door and there is a lot of population on this side which is either afraid of the LTTE or sympathetic to it.

Still there is time for New Delhi to take a bolder stand. It must reiterate that India seeks a solution "within the framework of the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka." Since New Delhi is to blame for having trained the LTTE cadre to begin with, it cannot escape its responsibility. It must use all levers of power to see that the LTTE accepts autonomy within the country. Military assistance rendered in the shape of the IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Force) during the Rajiv Gandhi government was a disaster. Had the IPKF defeated the LTTE, even if it could not eliminate it, New Delhi's credibility would have been higher and Colombo's problems fewer.

India is still not conscious of the dangers the LTTE may spell. It may be willing to strike but is afraid to wound. New Delhi should at least see that the LTTE does not get any succour from the Indian soil. With Jayalalitha as the Tamil Nadu chief minister, who is dead set against the LTTE, it should be possible for both the state and central governments to plug the avenues used for carrying goods to Jaffna. M Karunanidhi, the Tamil Nadu opposition leader, is also categorical on this matter. When I met him last at Chennai, he spared no words in condemning the LTTE. This should make Jayalalitha's task easier. Whatever New Delhi's justification to stay distant in the past, it is of no relevance to the situation prevailing in Sri Lanka today. India should realise that the LTTE's proposals for a separate state have come at a time when even the ink on the defence pact it has signed with Sri Lanka has not gone dry.

Kuldip Nayar is an eminent Indian columnist.