If the state cannot govern, violence will

Bangladesh is facing a crisis that extends far beyond the headlines. The show of violence unfolding in many parts of the country is not simply a failure of security. It is a sign that the moral foundations of political authority are weakening irrevocably. A society remains stable only when its citizens believe that disagreements can be settled through established means and institutions rather than fear. Once that belief falters, violence becomes a language through which political actors negotiate power. That shift is again visible in Bangladesh.

The burning alive of a bus driver in Mymensingh, the crude bomb and arson attacks in Dhaka and other parts of the country over the past week, with one person injured in the capital even on early Sunday morning, the targeting of religious and civic institutions, and the firebombing of Grameen Bank branches reveal a political landscape where violence is beginning to replace deliberation as the mechanism through which groups seek influence.

From the social media posts by Awami League, whose activities have been banned since May 12, it appears that they are partly responsible for this violence. A party that ruled for 15 and a half years through repression, enforced disappearances, and the slow corrosion of dissent now behaves like an underground network directing a "Dhaka Lockdown." Toppled by a mass uprising, it has no political or moral standing to behave as if it still commands the streets. Yet, AL dares to make lockdown calls, clearly understanding that it will trigger arson, blockades, and disruption at a moment when the country faces a fragile transition. To describe this as a "political programme" conceals the truth; it is an attempt to maintain relevance regardless of the cost paid by citizens.

However, others are also contributing to the volatility of the situation. Bangladesh is now operating in a political environment shaped by multiple actors, each responding to its own desired incentives. Several political forces, including BNP, NCP, Jamaat and other Islamist parties, student groups, and anti-Awami League coalitions declared that they would resist the lockdown call, creating a crowded and volatile civic space. Moving beneath this surface are criminal intermediaries, local strongmen, and opportunistic networks that require no formal sanction from any party and thrive when politics spills onto the streets. At such a phase, violence stops belonging to any single organisation and becomes dispersed, strategic, and far more difficult to contain. If the February election falters or is pushed off course, it will inevitably benefit those who gain from prolonged instability.

The interim government must also confront the weaknesses it has allowed to persist. Its response to the apparently planned attacks in different parts of the country over the last week signals anxiety rather than control. While the security measures taken are understandable given the circumstances, they also reveal a government bracing for threats it struggles to deter. A state supported by the military, Rab, and BGB would not be repeatedly outpaced by small groups armed with improvised explosives if the investigative and intelligence capacity of law enforcers worked properly. Instead, their credibility continues to erode as selective enforcement and political calculation still shape institutional behaviour.

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Stop the surge of violence urgently

The previous regime normalised coercion as a central tool of governance. Its fall removed the government but not the political culture it created, resulting in a landscape where partisan networks, criminal groups, and disillusioned actors operate with impunity. The interim government's repeated assurances about the rule of law have not yet produced the social conditions that make law authoritative. A teenager was detained on suspicion, while the perpetrators responsible for arson, sabotage, and bomb attacks continue to slip away in most cases. Citizens cannot trust a democratic transition if the state cannot guarantee basic public safety. The days surrounding November 13, when Sheikh Hasina's trial verdict date was announced, exposed these vulnerabilities clearly.

Some of the attacks also carry layered meaning. The attacks on Grameen Bank branches, which are woven into Bangladesh's global identity and linked to the chief adviser, are not an ordinary incident. When attackers can break windows, pour petrol, ignite flames, and disappear before anyone reacts, they are not only destroying property; they are testing the state's capacity to defend the institutions that express national identity.

The deepest danger lies in the collapse of deterrence. Violence spreads when perpetrators believe they will not be caught. Every stalled investigation, every unidentified gunman, or every night of evasion reinforces that belief. With the February election approaching, the moral and political stakes grow sharper. Fear, sabotage, and bombings can suppress voter turnout, undermine civic confidence, and restrict campaigning and public engagement. A vote conducted in fear is not a mandate. A referendum held under threat is not consent. A transition shaped by these forces loses its democratic character.

Bangladesh still has a path away from this precipice. The interim government must re-establish credible authority through visible and impartial enforcement. Those responsible for arson, sabotage, attacks on schools and religious sites, or the use of crude explosives must face consequences without regard to affiliation. Political forces must recognise that counter-mobilisation deepens the spiral of confrontation. The ousted party must not have the chance to use instability as a strategic resource.

This moment is not only about the February election. It concerns the future of the political community itself. Democratic institutions do not collapse overnight. They erode slowly and then suddenly. Bangladesh is approaching that threshold. Or perhaps it has already crossed it. If the state does not act with clarity, fairness and moral seriousness, the election will become symbolic rather than substantive. Real power will drift toward those prepared to deploy violence.

The work of political life is to preserve the conditions under which citizens can disagree without fear. That is the task before Bangladesh now. The stakes are nothing less than the survival of order, legitimacy, and the possibility of democratic governance.

Kazi A S M Nurul Huda is associate professor of philosophy at Dhaka University and the Cmelikova Visiting International Scholar in Leadership and Ethics at the University of Richmond. He can be reached at huda@du.ac.bd.

Views expressed in this article are the author's own. 

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