What is behind the Indo-US 'New Framework'?

However, very few would contest the assertion that this is the most far-reaching and comprehensive military agreement that India has ever signed with any country, and goes further than the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1971 with the then Soviet Union.

It certainly is an upgrading of Indo-US bilateral security relationship under the 1995 Agreed Minute of Defence relations, which was rendered virtually void after imposition of US sanctions following Pokhran in 1998.

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The Indo-US "New Framework" is perhaps the culmination of the US plans to see India become a major world power, that Dr Rice promised India in March this year.

The "New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship" promises enhanced military co-operation, including joint weapons production and development, further transfer of technology, expanded two-way defence trade, joint patrols of Asian sea-lanes, and enhanced intelligence exchanges and dual training programs. It also provides for US assistance to India on missile defence, including the latest Patriot Advanced Capability-III system.

Noticeable are the attempts of the Indian press as well as of some Indian analysts to project the "New Framework" as anything but a treaty, least of all a pact. It makes very little difference what name one calls it by; what is important are the potential benefits it holds out for both the parties, and what are, and will be, the implications for the other countries of the region.

Notwithstanding the strategic compulsions of containing China, as well as fulfilling US aspirations of stamping its presence in Asia, the latest Indo-US agreement is pure and simple economics dictating politics and foreign policy, strategy merely playing a supportive, if not altogether peripheral, role. It is a classic case of enlightened self-interests of two major democracies of the world being dovetailed to enhance US corporate interests matching with India's desire for diplomatic gains.

There was much distress in India in March last year when the United States accorded Pakistan the unique honour of being named a Major Non-NATO Ally. There was even a call by influential Indians to embark on "economic warfare with the 'enemy'." According to commentators, there was a "perceived hollowness" in the nature of the Indo-US strategic relationship that sprung from the fact that India was kept completely in the dark about the lifting of sanctions against Pakistan. What has compelled the changed position and shifts, particularly on the part of India, to partake in such a pact, which has come under fire from some quarters within the country?

The strategic shift has been in evidence ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union, in the way that India moved militarily closer to the US and to the West, although not totally away from Russia. Since 1991, there started the first of the many cooperations in the military sector, starting with interactions on tactical and strategic plane at both bilateral and multilateral levels, culminating in joint military exercises, something hardly conceivable during the Cold War era. It was again the realisation by India's strategic planners, and rightly so that, notwithstanding the Cold War acrimony that existed between the two countries, it was in India's strategic interest to seek understanding with the US, without giving short shrift to Russia, by then struggling to recover from its internal political and economic trauma.

India has hardly been outside the ambit of an alliance, either structured or loose, during the entire period of the Cold War. Even though its founding fathers, out of a sacred desire to keep away from the international power game, primarily out of economic reasons, propounded the non-aligned philosophy. Yet, for most part of the Cold War India remained either under treaty obligations or in close strategic partnership with the Soviet Union. It had nothing much to do with principles, if ever principles and international relations were congruous, but a lot to do with the pursuit of vital national interests. This was so vividly evident soon after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India's staunchest ally and its major military partner during the Cold War.

Russia remains, and will remain so, until the induction of the transformative system in certain areas of the Indian military is completed. And that is one of the aims of the recent defence arrangements -- to transform India's military. That is the key point that one has to keep in mind. New weapons platforms mean huge investment. That means a more thriving US defence industry. It is a simple question of economics; that is what all this exercise is about! And, as a recent Economist Intelligence Unit report suggests, the US is keen to break into this sizeable and potentially lucrative market for arms, hoping in particular to win a contract worth $4-5 billion to supply India's air force with 126 multi-role fighters.

Let us examine the operative statements that accompany the recent military pact between the two countries. The framework stated that both India and the US were entering a new era, "transforming our relationships to reflect our common principles and shared national interests." Coming from countries that were on the opposite sides of the Cold War, one wonders what are the national interests that are common to the two countries? Apart from the fact that there is a common perception on terrorism, there is a great disconnect between the two countries on how to fight it; US modality is considered skewed, following double standards. India was the only country in South Asia to have censured US aggression on Iraq in its parliament.

Insofar as its not-so-openly-articulated-but-implied policy of stamping its strategic presence in Asia, is concerned, the fact that the US is already present here, particularly in the Northeast (Japan and Korea) for long, and now Central Asia, (Uzbekistan and Kyrgiztan) make this rationale unconvincing.

Western think tanks as well as some analysts in this part of the world see the recent moves as a part of the strategy to counter China's growing influence that the US consider is threatening its interest. In reality, China has neither the power nor the strategic assets, much less the intention, to threaten US strategic interests.

What the US is actually apprehensive about, though, is China's growing economic strength that might eventually catch up with it. Thus, a policy that forced the former USSR to over spend on defence and thereby suffer an economic collapse may not be bad strategy against China. Whether China will be forced to go for large-scale military acquisition should it ever feel threatened with the actual prospects of being hemmed in, is a matter of conjecture.

For India its UN bid is the primary reason behind its current diplomatic maneuverings. Its rapprochement with China and assurance of continued Russian support precludes any misgiving from the two Asian giants. Thus, India's defense compact with the lone super power, with a large prospect of financial gains for the US, is for buying its support for a permanent seat at the UN. Nothing will give India more strategic dividend than a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

That, more than anything else, is the major motivation for the Indo-US New Framework.

The author is Editor, Defence and Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.