Rights AdvocacyTackling violence against women
Punishment is not enough
Whenever a particular incident of violence against women catches the media attention and is thrown in front of the public eye, the reactions that follow fall into a similar pattern. People are outrage and disgust, coupled with demands that these social perpetrators be punished and hung. They need to be eradicated from our society. Stronger laws and harsher punishments, the public cries, that is the way forward. When we consider the depths these acts of violence and cruelty reach, such reactions are unsurprising. Acid throwing that leaves young girls scarred for life, domestic violence culminating in brutal disfigurement, violent incidents of rape that leave their victims dead and mutilated. When we look back at the headlines that have gripped our front pages, the stories are sickening and often chill to the bone.
However, in turning to the law for solutions, we need to be more careful about our demands and more critical of the measures that follow. Our law-makers are no strangers to legislating in respect of women. An examination of the legislative history reveals a long list of laws that have been enacted especially for women. These enactments have not been shy in being heavy-handed with punishments; the Nari-O-Shishu Nirjaton Daman Ain (2000) alone has twelve offences which carry the death penalty. However, whilst enacting offences with harsher punishments might succeed in temporarily appeasing the public amidst their reactionary cries for more legislation, this practice largely ignores the relatively unchanged social reality for women, where stereotypes and myths surrounding the female gender remain deep-rooted and pervasive. In limiting our demands to simply the enactment of harsher punishments, we failed to address the deep-rooted stereotypes that plague existing laws and, as a result, we allow these stereotypes to pervade and influence the enactment of new legislation.
For example, Section 354 and Section 509 of the Penal Code, 1860 create offences of outraging and insulting the “modesty of a woman”. The scope of Section 354 is limited to actions involving criminal force and assault, but Section 509 widens the scope, allowing for the possibility of words and gestures also being interpreted as offences under the provision. However, the main problem with both these offences is that they are grounded in ideas of “womanly modesty” and thus, immediately, the focus shifts to the character of women rather than the violence done to them. Issues of modesty and morality often come to the fore in discussions of violence against women. Outfits of rape victims are scrutinised to ascertain whether she “asked for it” and the characters of domestic abuse victims are criticised to show that she “deserved it”.
If we turn to the Nari-O-Shishu Nirjaton Daman Ain with the hope that offences have progressed beyond such archaic definitions, disappointment awaits. The offence of outraging the modesty of a woman can be found in its reincarnated form, in Section 10 of the Nari-O-Shishu Nirjaton Daman Ain. The section stays true to its Penal Code predecessors; the focus is yet again on notions of womanly modesty. The main difference - Sections 354 and 509 of the Penal Code attract maximum punishments of 3 years and 1 year imprisonment, respectively, whilst Section 10 of the Nari-O-Shishu Nirjaton Daman Ain carries a minimum sentence of three years and a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment. Thus, Section 10 emerges as simply a repackaging of the existing Penal Code provisions, with a harsher punishment tagged on at the end.
In demanding changes and additions to the law, we cannot limit our demands to harsher punishments alone. We must go further and challenge the stereotypes that exist within our law if we are to truly change them. Harsher laws with heftier penalties will do no good if requirements of “modesty” and the like leave victims of violence outside the remit of protection. Simply enacting harsher punishments may be the quicker and easier route, but it has the long term effect of upholding the status quo rather than challenging it. To challenge it is the harder route and perhaps, on some levels, a more uncomfortable one for us in a society. Changing sexist stereotypes and presumptions within the law requires a parallel examination of the same stereotypes existing in our society. It may be easier to label the perpetrators of violence against women as degenerates whose actions are anomalies on the social spectrum, but the truth is that they are products of society; our society. In the midst of our demands for changes in law, we must not forget this fact; otherwise, legal change will be rendered useless by social reality.
The writer is a Barrister-at-Law.
However, in turning to the law for solutions, we need to be more careful about our demands and more critical of the measures that follow. Our law-makers are no strangers to legislating in respect of women. An examination of the legislative history reveals a long list of laws that have been enacted especially for women. These enactments have not been shy in being heavy-handed with punishments; the Nari-O-Shishu Nirjaton Daman Ain (2000) alone has twelve offences which carry the death penalty. However, whilst enacting offences with harsher punishments might succeed in temporarily appeasing the public amidst their reactionary cries for more legislation, this practice largely ignores the relatively unchanged social reality for women, where stereotypes and myths surrounding the female gender remain deep-rooted and pervasive. In limiting our demands to simply the enactment of harsher punishments, we failed to address the deep-rooted stereotypes that plague existing laws and, as a result, we allow these stereotypes to pervade and influence the enactment of new legislation.
For example, Section 354 and Section 509 of the Penal Code, 1860 create offences of outraging and insulting the “modesty of a woman”. The scope of Section 354 is limited to actions involving criminal force and assault, but Section 509 widens the scope, allowing for the possibility of words and gestures also being interpreted as offences under the provision. However, the main problem with both these offences is that they are grounded in ideas of “womanly modesty” and thus, immediately, the focus shifts to the character of women rather than the violence done to them. Issues of modesty and morality often come to the fore in discussions of violence against women. Outfits of rape victims are scrutinised to ascertain whether she “asked for it” and the characters of domestic abuse victims are criticised to show that she “deserved it”.
If we turn to the Nari-O-Shishu Nirjaton Daman Ain with the hope that offences have progressed beyond such archaic definitions, disappointment awaits. The offence of outraging the modesty of a woman can be found in its reincarnated form, in Section 10 of the Nari-O-Shishu Nirjaton Daman Ain. The section stays true to its Penal Code predecessors; the focus is yet again on notions of womanly modesty. The main difference - Sections 354 and 509 of the Penal Code attract maximum punishments of 3 years and 1 year imprisonment, respectively, whilst Section 10 of the Nari-O-Shishu Nirjaton Daman Ain carries a minimum sentence of three years and a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment. Thus, Section 10 emerges as simply a repackaging of the existing Penal Code provisions, with a harsher punishment tagged on at the end.
In demanding changes and additions to the law, we cannot limit our demands to harsher punishments alone. We must go further and challenge the stereotypes that exist within our law if we are to truly change them. Harsher laws with heftier penalties will do no good if requirements of “modesty” and the like leave victims of violence outside the remit of protection. Simply enacting harsher punishments may be the quicker and easier route, but it has the long term effect of upholding the status quo rather than challenging it. To challenge it is the harder route and perhaps, on some levels, a more uncomfortable one for us in a society. Changing sexist stereotypes and presumptions within the law requires a parallel examination of the same stereotypes existing in our society. It may be easier to label the perpetrators of violence against women as degenerates whose actions are anomalies on the social spectrum, but the truth is that they are products of society; our society. In the midst of our demands for changes in law, we must not forget this fact; otherwise, legal change will be rendered useless by social reality.
The writer is a Barrister-at-Law.
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