SPECIAL ON CLIMATE CONFERENCE 2011

Leadership crisis in climate negotiations

Where do the LDCs fit in?
Mizan R. Khan, Ph.D

Bangladesh experiences increased number of natural calamities under climate change impact. Photo: Anisur Rahman

Climate diplomacy is not ideology, but issue-based. From the beginning, there has been strategic shifts made by major groups involved in climate negotiations. This leadership crisis started particularly after the thirteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-13) at Bali. A new but important trend in climate diplomacy is evident since then. True to Morgenthau's `power politics', emission power (few big emitters) tends to rule the game - the impacting countries from both sides are calling the shots, and the impacted ones tend to be relegated to sidelines. At the moment, climate negotiations suffer from a leadership crisis, with the expanded EU unable to lead any more. This was manifest in Copenhagen, and also in Cancun. The EU now emits only about 15% of global GHGs; so it's a no-emission power. The UK, as before, looks likely to lead the game, with its radical proposal of emission cuts and a proposed budget of about 3 billion pounds for 2011-2015, now the 2nd highest funding, after Japan's recent commitment, to address climate issues. Canada, Japan and Russia, members of the Umbrella Group, have indicated they would not commit for the second commitment period (2013-2017) unless major emitters from developing countries do so too. China, as the biggest emitter in absolute terms, is leading both renewable energy generation and technology. As the next superpower, China has the potential for global leadership in climate diplomacy, if China shows some flexibility in its plan of emissions reduction. Within the G77 group, there are now so many negotiating blocks, which complicate matters when it comes to agreeing on a common position. This is the tragedy of a fragmented G77 -- sabotaging its own position. Simultaneously, the high vulnerability of the LDCs weakens their bargaining position vis-a-vis the big emitters on the planet. Desmond Tutu talks of an “adaptation apartheid”. This is characterised by industrial countries spending huge amounts of money enhancing their ability to adapt -- so-called adaptive capacity -- while the LDC efforts in adaptation remain grossly under-funded. Despite some good progress in adaptation in Cancun, with its agreement on establishing an Adaptation Framework, an Adaptation Committee and several work programmes, the legal basis of adaptation still remains weak compared to the mitigation agenda. This is the reason why the issue of justice in adaptation finance is not discussed the way it is done in case of burden-sharing in mitigation. This is a serious lacuna in strengthening the adaptation agenda. Here LDCs may play the lead role in mobilising about 100 countries which fall under the category of high vulnerability. This requires working out an agenda of mutual interest. But the LDC caucus is not functioning effectively. The active role of the Africa group somehow blurs the effectiveness of LDC leadership, as the majority of its members are from Africa. Here Bangladesh may fill the gap and lead the LDC process, without even having the Chair's position. Bangladesh has some features that distinguish it from the other LDCs: a) a country with about 160 million, the largest population among all the 49 LDCs (more than 1/5 of total LDC population); b) a democratic system of governance; c) consistent rate of economic growth of around 6%; d) a vibrant civil society and rich social capital, which made participatory governance a fact of life; e) success in population and disaster management; and e) Bangladesh is rich in human and intellectual capital, compared to many other G77 countries. These features should enable Bangladesh to provide leadership not only within the LDCs, but also the G77 group. So, Bangladesh should lead the group serving as its intellectual hub. In between COPs, Bangladesh can initiate some regional discussions, as the Africa group does, to articulate a common position on important issues. True to this approach, Bangladesh has hosted the Forum of Vulnerable Countries in mid-November, prior to Durban. This kind of meetings is also needed particularly for the Asian countries, which are not a coherent or active group, compared to the African group or the AOSIS.. It is to be reiterated that now-a-days environmental or climate diplomacy is more than economic diplomacy and poverty alleviation. It is a precondition of ensuring sustainable development and enhancing adaptive capacity of communities. It's time to operationalise the agreed principles of climate finance. Bangladesh delegation has the capacity to do this. Only it needs to be harnessed in earnest. Mizan R. Khan, Ph.D can be contacted at mizanrk@northsouth.edu.