The hidden tax on Bangladesh’s diaspora

Bangladesh receives around $24-$27 billion in remittances each year, placing the country firmly among the global top ten, ahead of Nigeria, Vietnam and Indonesia. It is the headline figure every government in Dhaka has, with reason, celebrated over the past two decades. It is also, on closer inspection, a figure that quietly indicts us.

The comparison that makes the case most clearly is the Philippines. It receives roughly $36-$38 billion in remittances a year, ranking fourth globally, with a diaspora of around 10 million people. Bangladesh, by most estimates, has about 13 million people living and working abroad.

We have around a third more people overseas than the Philippines, yet they send home nearly 40 percent less. The average Filipino migrant remits almost twice as much as the average Bangladeshi worker.

Several factors explain this gap, but one sits squarely within our reach: reducing the cost of leaving Bangladesh, still among the highest in the region.

For an unskilled or semi-skilled worker heading to the Gulf, the total cost often runs into several thousand dollars. Most borrow the money at usurious rates, using land, livestock or whatever assets the family can pledge.

The first six to 12 months of employment are therefore spent repaying debt rather than sending money home. That is the hidden tax. Across roughly 1 million Bangladeshis leaving for work each year, the lost remittances amount to billions of dollars.

This burden falls hardest on those least able to bear it. Bangladesh pays twice: first through the worker and then through remittance flows that never reach home.

The international context is changing. In April 2026, the French Presidency of the G7 convened the 2nd Employment Working Group of the G7 Social in Paris, where one flagship outcome was a toolkit on the responsible recruitment of migrant workers.

When published, it will define standards that destination governments and ESG-conscious employers are increasingly expected to enforce. Countries able to demonstrate compliant recruitment corridors at scale will become preferred partners. Those that cannot risk being confined to less attractive jobs and lower wages.

Bangladesh already has an overlooked advantage. Between 2017 and 2021, during preparations for the FIFA World Cup, at least one Bangladeshi recruitment agency sent a substantial cohort of workers to Qatar under arrangements where the destination employer covered every recruitment cost. The International Labour Organization and the International Organization for Migration documented the programme, making it one of the best-recorded examples of zero-cost recruitment from South Asia.

The feasibility question has therefore been answered. Zero-cost recruitment from Bangladesh can work. The remaining question is whether destination employers make it the norm.

Here, the private sector is better placed than the government to lead this transition. Government policy remains important, but building recruitment corridors and maintaining relationships with overseas employers are private-sector functions. The Qatar model was developed without formal government facilitation. It can be replicated, provided policy supports responsible operators and penalises those who do not comply.

The economics are now catching up with the ethics. Employers will increasingly recruit through corridors where workers pay nothing. Bangladesh can become one of those corridors or watch opportunities gradually shift elsewhere.

As Bangladesh enters the next decade with one of the largest working-age populations in its history, we will need every available lever to create productive employment. Protecting migrant workers from this hidden tax is one of them.

The writer was an invited panellist on responsible recruitment at the G7 Social Employment Working Group, Paris, in April 2026