Mystifying nationalism even more
Although the young and (so) ardent author, Adeel Khan, professes to be an unbiased analyst of nation-state and nationalism, in practice he is not so, since his is the Marxist view that the state is essentially an institution for managing and mediating class relations to maintain the dominance of one faction/s over the rest. To him the modern state is an instrument of capitalist expansion, and he subsequently pushes the analysis further to the point of viewing it as a thing akin to the supreme evil personified. Or, inversely, the supreme godhead.
That evil, he avers, emanates from the "extreme interventionist nature" of the modern-state that forced Pakistan to turn into a bureaucratic, and later, military state to preserve the state's control over economy and monopoly over means of violence and coercion. Compared to the state structure during the last two centuries, which he thinks were subordinate parts of their societies, Khan identifies the modern state as an all-powerful political institution that has spread its tentacles to every aspect of human life and has taken total control of society. Do we not hear the voice of a preacher here?
For all latest news, follow The Daily Star's Google News channel. While comparing it to a godhead, he says, "Doubtless, the state has assumed the role that God is presumed to play: Watchful all the time, seeing through every individual and keeping tabs on their activities. There is hardly any aspect of human activity, whether social, cultural, economic or even 'private', which is, in one way or another, not monitored by the watchful eyes of the state through its elaborate system of record keeping, policing and surveillance."
Well, at least he understood one basic truth -- good and evil are but the opposite sides of the same coin!
Still, Khan's exposition of the history of Pakistan reveals some quite noteworthy features--especially what he calls the ideological engineering of state-nationalism as against the indigenous ethnic nationalism. Khan argues that there are essentially two forms of nationalism: State nationalism, and ethnic nationalism.
The groups having dominance in the state engineer the overreaching nationalist ideology that demands homogeneity and one-ness, like the one Mohajir-Punjabi axis wanted immediately after the emergence of Pakistan. That is an example of state nationalism.
On the other hand, the anger of the non-dominant groups engenders nationalist movements that reject the official ideology of the one-ness of the nation and demand recognition for their particular identities, as did the Bengalis, Balochis and Sindhis. In Khan's view, those are ethnic nationalisms.
"The difference between state nationalism and ethnic nationalism is that the former belongs exclusively to the political sphere, whereas the latter is essentially founded in the sociological sphere, and only takes a political shape in the process of its struggle. State nationalism is programmatic from start to finish and is imposed from the top through ideological engineering. Ethnic nationalism arises from below, essentially from a non-programmatic base, and in the process may or may not espouse a programme and become political. As long as it does not demand political autonomy within the state or does not struggle for a separate state, it continues to be non-programmatic and apolitical, but the moment it charts out a programme for itself, its confrontation with state nationalism becomes inevitable."
So far so good! Then comes a surprising conclusion: "In most cases, state nationalism before the establishment of the state is but ethnic nationalism. [Ironically] After acquiring the state, however, the character and the ideology of ethnic nationalism become unrecognisably different. Indeed, it adopts the methods, the ideology and the policies against which it once struggled."
This seems to be a garbled application of dialectics sans any synthesis.
That was why, he goes on, the UPite- and Punjabi-dominated Muslim League, which had championed Muslim nationalism (but can we classify it as ethnic nationalism?) in pre-1947 era, after attaining the state of Pakistan became intolerant of the separate identities of Bengalis, Baloch, Pukhtuns or Sindhis, rejecting them as provincialism, if not separatism.
If we apply his logic, can we say the Bengali ethnic nationalism, too, after begetting a state in 1971, turned into a state nationalism and became intolerant of the ethnic identities and demands of hill peoples, Manipuris, etc.? Is it probable that it even named itself after the state, as Bangladeshi nationalism, to express its self-love or hatred of others including its kin in West Bengal, Assam, Tripura and elsewhere? At the least, these should make for some interesting speculations.
The book, in its later chapters, does present a comprehensive overview of events related to and in Pakistan before its emergence in 1947 and then the Mohajir-Punjabi-dominated central government's relationships with the ethnic communities of Pukhtuns, Balochis, Sindhis and Mohajirs, once it lets go of its initial theoretical focus on the state. This should be a good enough reason for any reader to go through it.
The language is both passionate and jargon-free, which makes for enjoyable reading. For instance, read this ardent passage: "I see Punjabis as the dominant group, and Mohajirs and Pukhtuns as comparatively more privileged groups and therefore allies of Punjabis at different points in their history. I have no illusions that Bengalis or Sindhis or Baloch would have behaved differently had they been in the place of Punjabis; such idealism is not one of my major failings. For ... I see what is--human, alas, all-too-human!" He ends it by quoting Nietzche (we do, too) after reading the book.
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