How the proposed changes to the Cyber protection Act contradict human rights standards

We have a complicated history with cyber laws. The ICT Act, 2006; the Digital Security Act, 2018; and the Cyber Security Act, 2023 were all criticised for curtailing freedom of expression. In fact, the Cyber Protection Ordinance 2025 states in its preamble that the 2023 Act should be repealed because it curtails freedom of expression and other fundamental rights. This is why it is important to investigate whether the new Amendment Bill passes the human rights test.

Firstly, the amendment raises the penalty under section 25, which deals with sexual harassment, blackmailing, etc., from a maximum of two years to five years’ imprisonment (up to ten years where the victim is a woman or a child). Moreover, it adds defamation, humiliation, and bullying to the list of intentions for the offence. Defamation is already a criminal offence under section 499 of the Penal Code, 1860. Creating a heavier, parallel online offence for the same conduct raises the kind of chilling effect the Human Rights Committee has repeatedly warned against.

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“Defamation is already a criminal offence under section 499 of the Penal Code, 1860. Creating a heavier, parallel online offence for the same conduct raises the kind of chilling effect the Human Rights Committee has repeatedly warned against.”

Notably, the UN Human Rights Committee’s (HRC) General Comment No. 34, paragraph 47, urges states to consider decriminalising defamation altogether and states that imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty for it. In this light, Article 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights demands, and General Comment 34 restates, that a restriction on speech must be formulated with enough precision that a person can regulate their conduct by it. Article 39 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, which guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, and speech subject only to reasonable restrictions, is engaged on the same ground as Article 19 of the ICCPR.

Secondly, the Bill defines bullying as repeated conduct that causes another person physical or mental harm or distress, fear, social ostracism, isolation or loneliness (S. 25). Arguably, the definition is so wide that it can just as easily catch legitimate forms of expression, such as political criticism, satire, consumer complaints, or investigative reporting, simply because the subject found it to be uncomfortable. Again, the broad ambit runs against the necessity and proportionality test set out in Article 19(3) ICCPR and General Comment 34 (paragraphs 33-35). Indeed, international human rights jurisprudence has settled that a restriction on expression must be the least intrusive instrument available, not one broad enough to catch legitimate speech along with the harm it is meant to address.

Next, section 26(A) criminalises publishing ‘unsupported or unverified information’ as rumour, and false, distorted, or misleading information as disinformation, with a penalty of up to ten years’ imprisonment or a fine of forty lakh takas. It needs to be remembered that unverified information is not the same as false information. During emergencies, natural disasters, or fast-moving human rights crises, information often cannot be independently verified in real time, and journalists, researchers, and ordinary citizens should not face a decade in prison for reporting what they reasonably believed to be true. General Comment 34 requires that any law restricting expression be precise enough to avoid conferring unfettered discretion on those charged with its enforcement (paragraph 25), and that the penalty attached be proportionate to the harm (paragraph 34).

Similarly, the amended section 8 allows the authorities to block or remove content on the broad grounds of mere apprehension of harm to public order, or content considered defamatory or insulting to the state. This once again sits uneasily with the proportionality requirement in Article 19(3) ICCPR.

None of this is to deny that cybercrime, sextortion, and online abuse of women and children are real and serious harms that deserve a strong legal response. The concern is that several of its provisions are drafted so broadly that they could reach far beyond that legitimate aim, into territory the Constitution and Bangladesh’s own international commitments were designed to protect. The Bill has not yet been passed, and, as officials have themselves acknowledged in public discussion, there is still room to narrow these clauses before it is finalised.