Enhancing powers of parliamentary standing committees

M. Abdul Latif Mondal
Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) presented its report titled Parliament Watch at a press conference at the National Press Club, Dhaka on March 1, 2005. The report "is based on proceedings of the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th sessions of the 8th Parliament held last year i.e. in 2004."

The important findings of the report, as reported in the media, are: (1) parliament failed to ensure accountability of the government; (2) parliamentary standing committees on different ministries could not play an effective role in investigating corruption and irregularities in different organisations under the ministries concerned; (3) the lawmakers of the main opposition party Awami League were absent from parliament for 48 out of 83 days last year; (4) the lawmakers raised irrelevant issues including praising their own party leaders and criticising the opponents 1565 times in four parliament sessions; (5) none of the 491 adjournment motions moved in parliament saw the light of discussion; (6) the four sessions witnessed severe quorum crisis almost every day; (7) of the Tk 22.11 crore spent to run the four sessions of House last year, more than Tk 5 crore had been wasted due to quorum crises alone; (8) Prime Minister's question-answer session, boycotted by the main opposition, was not held on 32 per cent of the scheduled days or questions were just tabled. Ninety per cent of the questions were from Treasury Bench lawmakers.

In another development on the same day, the chairmen of the parliamentary standing committees in a discussion on Promotion of Better Understanding and Collaboration amongst the Parliamentary Standing Committees and Ministries of the Government in Dhaka on March 1 accused the ministries of non-cooperation with the parliamentary standing committees and non-implementation of their recommendations. They also accused some senior ministers for their alleged attempt to convince the Prime Minister that the existing provision should be changed to enable the ministers to head the ministerial standing committees. The chairmen of the standing committees univocally demanded formulation of clear rules of procedure giving due authority to them to execute the decisions. The discussion in this article, has, therefore, been limited to enhancing the powers of the parliamentary standing committees in parliament.

Article 76 of the Constitution of Bangladesh provides that parliament shall appoint from among its members the following standing committees:

(a) a public accounts committee;

(b) committee of privileges; and

(c) such other standing committees as the rules of procedure of Parliament require.

The rules of procedure framed and adopted by Parliament guide and regulate functional details, overall operation and terms of reference of the parliamentary committees. The parliamentary standing committees are generally grouped into such categories as ministerial committees, for example, Committee on Ministry of Commerce, Committee on Ministry of Industries, Committee on Ministry of Foreign Affairs etc.; finance and audit committees; and a number of other committees of standing nature, for instance, Committee on Private Members' Bills and Resolutions, Committee of Privileges, Committee on Government Assurances, Committee on Rules of Procedure etc. The above groupings exclude select or special committees.

The parliamentary standing committees that are of greater importance to general public are ministerial committees, and finance and audit committees. According to rules of procedure, the functions of a standing committee on a ministry are to examine any bill or other matter referred to it by Parliament, to review the works relating to a ministry which falls within its jurisdiction, to enquire into any activity or irregularity and serious complaint in respect of the ministry and to examine, if it deems fit, any such other matter as may fall within its jurisdiction and to make recommendations. Finance and audit committees namely, Committee on Public Accounts, Committee on Estimates and Committee on Public Undertakings "are considered as special mechanisms of the Sangsad (Parliament) to perform its supervisory role over the government expenditures. The Public Accounts Committee scrutinises annual financial accounts and appropriations as approved, and pinpoints the irregularities of the government bodies with necessary recommendations and remedial measures. The Committee on Estimates examines estimates throughout the financial year and gives suggestions for ensuring economy and efficiency in governance process. Accounts and reports of public institutions are reviewed by the Public Undertakings Committee, which points out the gap between the affairs of public offices and the on-going government policies."

The above standing committees submit their reports with findings and recommendations within the fixed or extended period of time for presentation to the House. The committees are thus recommending entities. This prompted some chairmen of the standing committees to observe that the inability of the committees to implement the decisions simply made the committees "sound and fury, signifying nothing."

Now let us see the powers of the standing committees in some other countries having presidential or parliamentary system of government.

In the United States of America, all the legislative powers are vested in a Congress consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives. In Congress, all bills are referred to committees before there is any discussion on their principles. In the great majority of cases the bill goes to an appropriate standing committee of the House into which it is introduced automatically. The title of the bill indicates which particular standing committee should receive it. Under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 there are 19 standing committees in the House of Representatives and 15 in the Senate. A standing committee exercises great powers as (1) it may recommend the bill back to the Chamber concerned with a recommendation that it be passed; (2) it may amend the bill and recommend that it be passed as amended; (3) it may entirely change the original bill except its title and report a new one in its place; (4) it may report the bill unfavourably and recommend that it need not be passed; (5) it may "pigeon-hole" the bill, that is, to take no action on the bill at all or report it so late in the session that it may not find an opportunity for consideration.

In the British Parliament, every bill, except a money bill, automatically goes to one of the standing committees after the second reading, unless the House resolves that it should go either to the Committee of the Whole House or to a Select Committee. In the British Parliament, the standing committees are less powerful in the sense that a committee finds out the omissions and commissions of the bill and then submits it to the House which is the final authority. But in the US Congress, only the bill that has been favourably reported by the committee has the chance of being passed.

It appears from the above that the standing committees in the US Congress and the British Parliament are basically meant for examining bills and making appropriate recommendations.

A great similarity exists between the standing committees of the Lok Sabha (House of People) of India and those of the Bangladesh Parliament in respect of their powers, functions and conduct of business. The standing committees of the Lok Sabha are generally grouped into such categories as parliamentary committees, for instance, Business Advisory Committee, House Committee, Committee on Petitions; departmentally related committees, for example, Committee on Agriculture, Committee on Defence, Committee on External Affairs; and Ad-hoc Committees, namely Committee on Ethics, Joint Committee on Installation of Portraits/Statutes of National Leaders and Parliamentarians in Parliament Complex. The above committees are basically recommending bodies.

Now the question arises as to whether enhancement of powers of our parliamentary committees, particularly of ministerial committees, should receive favourable consideration. We have to be watchful that no imbalance is created between the executive and legislature, the two of the three organs of the state. The other organ is judiciary. As we have seen above, the role of the standing committees in the US Congress and the British Parliament is limited to the legislative business. In our neighbouring countries also, the standing committees on ministries act as the recommending bodies and the authority for taking decisions on the reports and recommendations of the committees rests with the House.

It would, therefore, be advisable that the Prime Minister's office asks the ministries to render all cooperation and assistance in the discharge of the functions and responsibilities of the ministerial committees. The Daily Star's editorial of March 3 rightly noted: "This sort of foot-dragging on the part of the ministries must end. The ministries must be directed to comply and cooperate fully with the standing committees and to take their own role more seriously."

It is beyond doubt that parliamentary committees could be the most effective instrument of parliamentary oversight if they could effectively discharge their duties. But this has not always happened. Public Administration Reform Commission in its report of June, 2000 has observed, "The activities of the standing committees are usually confined to review of some routine findings of Ministries and other Agencies rather than in-depth investigation into budgetary and implementation performance."

To conclude, granting the standing committees on ministries more powers is a highly sensitive and debatable issue. It needs a very close examination. A broad national consensus is necessary before initiating any legal process on the issue. In other words, nothing should be done in haste.

M. Abdul Latif Mondal is a former Secretary to the government.