Why the interim government’s ‘Yes’ vote advocacy is legitimate

Bangladesh’s upcoming July National Charter referendum has triggered a debate that goes beyond the substance of constitutional reform. At the heart of this debate lies this question: can the interim government openly advocate for a “Yes” vote? Detractors warn that government advocacy undermines neutrality, violates democratic norms, and also risks undermining the political process. However, when examined within the country’s political context and comparative constitutional practices, the case for principled government advocacy is stronger than critics acknowledge.

Much of the criticism rests on the assumption that the interim government is akin to a conventional non-party caretaker government with a narrow mandate to conduct elections. That assumption is flawed. This government did not assume office under any constitutional provision; it arose from a popular uprising that rejected authoritarian rule and demanded a fundamental restructuring of the political order. Its legality originates from the constituent power of the people, and its legitimacy is derived not merely from political neutrality but from its mandate to pursue reforms that would enable a transition to a more accountable system of governance. The referendum on the July National Charter reforms lies at the heart of this mandate. It is the institutional means by which the reform agenda is placed directly before the people. To insist that the government remain silent on the referendum’s outcome is to misunderstand its distinctive character and purpose.

Some argue that the government cannot campaign for a “Yes” vote without influencing the voting process. This argument, however, conflates advocacy with coercion. By supporting the reforms, the government is not denying citizens a choice. No voter is prevented from rejecting the reforms, political parties remain free to campaign for a “No” vote, and any rejection would be binding. If voters approve the reforms, they acquire democratic legitimacy that no uprising alone could supply. By urging a “Yes” vote, the government is not circumventing public consent but submitting itself to it. 

The claim that citizens lose their capacity for independent judgement once a government expresses a preference reflects an authoritarian mindset inherited from the past decade, which sought to regulate every aspect of public life. Democratic theory rests on the opposite premise: that voters are capable of weighing arguments, assessing sources, and deciding for themselves.

Comparative constitutional law offers a useful perspective, particularly through the US Supreme Court’s government speech doctrine. Although Bangladesh’s legal system is distinct, the doctrine captures a core democratic principle: that governments are not constitutionally required to remain neutral when articulating their own policy positions.

In Rust v. Sullivan (1991), the US Supreme Court upheld regulations barring federally funded doctors from discussing abortion, affirming that when the government funds and administers a programme, it may promote its chosen policy objectives. Similarly, in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association (2005), the court upheld a mandatory levy on beef producers to fund generic advertising, holding that citizens have no constitutional right to object merely because public funds convey a government message they oppose. In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum (2009), the court ruled that monuments in public parks constitute government speech, permitting officials to select which messages to display without violating free speech guarantees.

The reasoning here is straightforward. Democratic governments exist to pursue policies. They may advocate their positions, so long as dissenting voices remain free. Government advocacy becomes objectionable only when it crosses into coercion or suppression, not when it advances a case and submits itself to public judgement.

This balanced approach is echoed in the Council of Europe’s guidelines on constitutional referendums. While the Venice Commission emphasises that “the national, regional and local authorities must not influence the outcome of the vote by excessive, one-sided campaigning,” it explicitly recognises that “contrary to the case of elections, it is not necessary to completely prohibit the intervention of the authorities supporting or opposing a proposal submitted to referendum.” Moreover, the use of public funding for campaigning purposes, while subject to restrictions, has not been strictly prohibited. Thus, the guidelines do not demand governmental silence—they demand proportionality and fairness.

Some critics point to Ireland’s decision in McKenna v An Taoiseach, which barred the use of public funds to promote one side of a referendum. But McKenna reflects a jurisdiction-specific interpretation grounded in Ireland’s constitutional framework; it does not establish a universal democratic rule. Indeed, many democracies, including the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, permit varying degrees of government advocacy in referendums. Comparative practice shows not a single model but differing constitutional balances between neutrality and political leadership.

Bangladesh must therefore assess this question on its own constitutional and political terms, especially given the transitional, post-uprising context in which this referendum is taking place. There is no constitutional or legal bar preventing the interim government from supporting a “Yes” vote, nor is a reasonable use of public funds for campaigning questionable. The interim government derives its authority from the constituent power of the people and holds office on the strength of its commitment to comprehensive state reforms. In that context, it is not only permitted but also morally obliged to campaign in support of the reforms and submit them to popular approval.

History shows that transitional governments often advocate constitutional reform in the aftermath of popular uprisings. Following Egypt’s 2011 revolution, interim authorities actively campaigned for constitutional changes, explaining the need for reform and urging public approval through successive referendums. Tunisia’s post-Arab Spring transition similarly featured state-led advocacy as part of redefining the political order. 

In Bangladesh, the interim government is expected to be neutral with respect to the forthcoming elections, but it is not—and need not be—neutral on the reform agenda. It has already established multiple reform commissions precisely to pursue far-reaching changes. Government advocacy in favour of a “Yes” vote is therefore entirely proper. In this context, advocacy is not authoritarian; it is a necessary element of democratic reconstruction. The government’s silence in the name of neutrality would not protect democracy; it may weaken it.Citizens are entitled to know what the government believes the uprising stood for, which reforms it supports, and why those reforms matter.

The July National Charter referendum presents a clear constitutional question of whether Bangladesh should adopt safeguards designed to prevent the re-emergence of unchecked executive power, or retain the existing constitutional framework. A vote in favour of the charter is not an endorsement of the interim government. It is an endorsement of reform, institutional restraint, and decentralisation of power. The interim government is legally and democratically entitled to articulate this position. The ultimate determination, however, rests with the people.

Imran A Siddiq, Barrister-at-law, is a senior advocate. He has served as a member of the Constitution Reform Commission (2024-2025) and the expert legal panel of the National Consensus Commission (2025).

Views expressed in this article are the author's own. 

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