Transit or no transit?
AS this article goes to press, Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, Indian External Affairs Minister, would have gone back home after his 2-day whirlwind tour. The signing of various treaties had raised, as usual, accusations from the opposition that the government was 'selling-off' the country and compromising the national sovereignty by signing unequal treaties with India. The Government, after opening the Pandora's Box, seemed to have quickly gone on the back-foot. The Commerce Minister, who had been an outspoken champion of transit, changed his own position somewhat and said that there will be no transit or transhipment treaty, only a renewal of the existing Indo-Bangladesh Trade Agreement.
Transit, more specifically land transit between India and Bangladesh, has long been a matter of political opportunism. It involves giving access to India of a number of road and rail routes across Bangladesh to carry goods to and from its northeastern states. A look at the map clearly shows how Bangladesh almost dissects India's northeastern states, the slim physical contact maintained through a 20-mile wide corridor, popularly known as "Shiliguri Corridor." Whereas Bangladesh feels encircled by India on three sides, people in the India's north-eastern states feel that Bangladesh is sitting across them and the Indian mainland. Just as a Bangladeshi feels geographically bottled up and overwhelmed, an Assamese or a Mizo feels cut-off and distanced from the mainstream India. Perennial insurgency that had plagued north-eastern states owes much to this sense of isolation and seclusion. The partition of India in 1947 created innumerable legacies -- cut-up and dislocated communications, physical isolation and political separatism are some of them.
It is interesting to note that despite partition in 1947 and war over Kashmir in 1948, India continued to have direct rail and river transit across East Pakistan (Bangladesh) until 1965. When war broke out in September 1965 in Kashmir and West Pakistan, Pakistan government stopped transit traffic across the then East Pakistan thus depriving the provincial government of the revenues they used to receive from the transit traffic. While river transit from Kolkata to Assam via Jamuna and Meghna restarted in 1972 and continues to this day, albeit in a much reduced volume, the rail and road transit never restarted and sank into the political and bureaucratic quagmire.
Meanwhile, India had developed multiple rail and road communication through the Shiliguri Corridor. The aim was to develop safeguard against possible cut-offs due to war or insurgency. Although the communication system is multi-modal and secure, its carrying capacity remains limited in view of the increasing demand of a growing Indian economy. The circuitous route adds to the cost of goods and services to the people in the northeast. Since 1947, the area saw little industrialization or economic progress. Whereas in 1947, Assam and the northeast had the highest per capita income in India, today it has the lowest. No wonder, India and especially people of northeast, had been looking forward to a direct route across Bangladesh. Tied with it has been a demand for access to the port of Chittagong for the region's external trade and commerce. Over the last three decades, the liberals and centrists within BNP had stated in public the positive impact that transit trade could have on the economic wellbeing of the country. The business bodies such as FBCCI had taken a stand in favour of the transit treaty. Ironically, BNP-JI alliance has found an unlikely ally among the extreme left in opposing the transit treaty with India. They argue that providing transit to India will mean surrendering national sovereignty and creating an inroad of Indian hegemony.
Throughout Europe, Americas and much of the Middle-east goods and passengers are freely crossing multiple borders often without stopping at checkpoints. Why it should be different in South Asia is difficult to understand.
If Bangladesh and India sign the transit treaty, goods train or trucks could enter and depart through designated land ports. The two countries could mutually work out the service charges. Bangladesh could use the additional revenues thus generated to improve the road and rail communication within the country. Besides direct revenue earning for the Government, transit traffic will mean more service and gas stations, more rest area, more hotels and restaurants, each generating additional employment and income for local people. Bangladesh could then be suitably poised to enter the Asian Highway or the Asian Railway Network.
Use of Chittagong port by the north-eastern states of India had been on the table for long. Here too, a section of rightwing politicians' stand had been that it would compromise national security. Of course, they never explain how handling Indian containers would hinder national security. Indian ships are calling on Chittagong port all the time just as Bangladeshi ships do at the Indian ports. If that does not hinder national security, how loading/unloading containers destined for Assam, for example, will jeopardise national security? While compromising national security is difficult to comprehend, economic benefits of handling increased traffic are clear for all to see. More traffic, more profit it is as easy as that. More traffic for Chittagong will mean more work in the port, more employment, more hotels, restaurants, banks, insurance etc. Increased traffic will further justify establishing a deep-sea port off Chittagong. Growing international traffic will increase prospect of foreign investment in the development of port infrastructures. A busier seaport will mean a busier airport too.
Bangladesh's geo-strategic position gives us a great advantage. We are suitably positioned to serve as a transit hub not only to India, but also to Nepal, Bhutan and even Tibetan China. In future, this could make Bangladesh a regional hub of trade and commerce.
The arguments put forward by those opposing the transit treaty are reminders of a bygone era where ironclad barriers insulated societies, where outsiders were always considered enemies. BNP leadership claims that it would favour a multilateral transit treaty under the banner of SAARC, but not a bilateral one between Bangladesh and India. This, in fact, takes away our sovereign right to enter treaty with any country of our own choosing, within the ambit of SAARC or outside it. They continue to argue that providing transit means providing India with a 'corridor.' It smacks of creating a smokescreen to hoodwink the people. They argue that Bangladesh is going to lose its sovereign rights on the roads and railways that the Indian trucks and railway wagons would use. This is far from the truth. Does Bangladesh lose its sovereignty when Indian steamers or barges travel down our rivers?
The argument that the anti-government insurgents will attack Bangladesh's transport network if we allow transit to India casts doubt on our ability to defend our own assets inside the country. It presupposes our security forces' inability to defend our territory a dangerous supposition in the least. Do we close down the Afghanistan embassy in Dhaka because Taliban or Islamic militants threaten it? Did we stop trading with Nepal when the Maoist guerrillas were fighting the Nepalese government? If the answers were 'No', then the same argument will apply here. Our trade and commerce, our internal and external relations are guided by what we perceive to be our best interest notwithstanding any threat from any quarter. Continued dillydallying with transit issue has already cost Bangladesh dearly. We have lost enormous revenue surcharges that we would have got over all these years. Only because we might have to give transit to India had prevented us from signing on to the Asian Highway and the Trans-Asian railway network. Now there is a looming possibility that both the projects might bypass Bangladesh and we might remain like an island cut-off from the mainland. In fact, no one waits for ever.
Few years back, the Chief Minister of Mizoram was in Dhaka seeking a possible use of the Karnaphuli river system and Chittagong port for external trade of his state. While we kept them waiting, last year India signed a road-building project with Myanmar connecting Mizoram with the port of Sittwe. Few years back India wanted to buy gas from Myanmar through a pipeline across Bangladesh. It was a golden opportunity. Not only could we have earned revenues, more importantly, we could have tapped gas for Chittagong and Khulna region at virtually no overhead cost. But our guardians of national sovereignty would not allow the pipeline to pass through Bangladesh and the project fell through. Now we want gas from Myanmar, but Myanmar is not interested. Remember, in the world of intense competition, no one waits for others, the caravan moves on.
The author is a freelancer.
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