The Gaza misadventure and its aftermath

Photo: AP
THE seismic impact of the recent 22-day Gaza war, while exposing the vulnerability of the Middle Eastern order, has created a new strategic reality, accentuating the urgency of the Arab-Israeli peace process. The purpose of the well planned, barbaric but fruitless Israeli onslaught was to extirpate Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, from Gaza. Below is a brief analysis of the political maneuvering during the conflict, the brunt of which was borne by the battered civilian Palestinians, and its aftereffect which is perceived to be more threatening than the war itself. If the measure of victory in a war is the magnitude of the havoc wreaked, then Israel has definitely won it; at the moral level, however, it is Hamas -- a case of triumph of "mind over matter." The fact that it is very much in control of Gaza, even after three weeks of pounding from the most powerful regional military (employing aircrafts, gunships, drones, warships, artillery, tanks, phosphorus agent, bunker busters, etc.), makes it victorious. In order to win the war, it only needed to survive, which it has not only managed to do, but has done so with an enhanced popularity in the region, including the Fatah-administered West Bank. In the eyes of the Palestinians and the Arab streets, Hamas has stood up to Israel, whereas Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah group have been largely discredited, for not only failing to extract concessions from Israel for the Palestinians, but for appearing as its puppets, which is not far from the truth. The onslaught was expected to boost the chances of the Israeli government's coalition partners in the upcoming general elections, contest between who has been able to prove their hawkish credentials to the electorate at the cost of innocent Palestinians. The beneficiary of this war is likely to be Benjamin Netanyahu's conservative Likud Party, well-known for its undisguised disdain for the peace process, and preference for putting it in "formaldehyde." However, not all Israelis have been supportive of their government's sordid operation in Gaza, which slaughtered 1400 lives. One prominent Israeli peace activist lamented that, "…[O]ur conduct here in the region has, for a long time, been flawed, immoral and unwise." Contrary to the claims of the neoconservatives, Israel was not fighting a proxy war against Iran in Gazait was fighting against the Palestinians. Iran has so far extended only financial, not military assistance to Hamas, and the political support it professed, was more rhetorical than real, despite anti-Israeli invectives forthcoming from its leaders. Besides, it had an interest in not jeopardizing the nascent normalization process between Iran and the Obama administration, by engaging in direct confrontation with Israel. According to one analyst, "Iran's relationship with Hamas is a marriage of convenience at best." In fact Iran's priority at the moment is managing the Arab reaction to any future Iran-US rapprochement, rather than complicating the process. Likewise, Syria's politically sound but logistically ineffective response to the Gaza tragedy was considerably informed by the prospective diplomatic breakthrough with the new US administration. (This, however, does not prevent it from captalising on Israel's failure in Gaza). Hezbollah, the Syrian-backed Iranian ally, while expressing solidarity with Hamas, showed restraint by only inveighing against Israel. It was mindful of its own political ascendancy in Lebanese politics, which it did not want to imperil by opening a second front in southern Lebanon. Initial support for the Israeli mauling of pro-Iran Hamas was implicit in Saudi Arabia and Egypt's silence, and their spurning of Qatar's call for an emergency Arab League summit at the outbreak of hostilities. Saudi largesse of US$1 billion was subsequently pledged for reconstruction, but only after the massive destruction of Gaza's civilian infrastructure. Suppression of Hamas was also expected by Cairo to restrain the Muslim Brotherhood-led opposition. The debilitating division of the Arab world between the so-called "moderates," Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, and the "extremists," Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas, (which the Bush administration so skillfully sought to foster by projecting the spectre of Shi'a threat emanating from a rising Iran), was instrumental in prolonging and aggravating the misery of the hapless Gaza residents. The bizarre logic of the situation compelled the "moderates" to regard Israel as the "lesser evil," in the region, and cooperate with it, an otherwise improbable occurrence. Excepting for the abstention from vetoing the January 8 UN Security Council cease-fire resolution, the outgoing Bush administration extended vital political, diplomatic, military and moral support to the Israeli mission of eliminating Hamas, accused to be a purveyor of terror. The latest outbreak of violence has been attributed to its eight-year neglect of the Mideast peace process, and the marginalization of Hamas through economic sanctions and blockade, while supporting the pliant Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. (It may be mentioned that, in the late 1970s and 80s, Hamas, an offshoot of Egypt's Islamic Brotherhood, had tacit Israeli and American support for offsetting the role of late Yassir Arafat's secular faction). The new Obama administration, though hamstrung by the Gaza war, needs to eschew its predecessor's divide and rule policy of driving a wedge between the Hamas and Fatah, and splitting the regional countries along spurious ideological/sectarian lines, and work toward a just, comprehensive and durable peace in the region. It may begin by dismantling the term "axis of evil," normalizing relations with Iran and Syria, engaging Hamas and bringing it, without any pre-condition, onboard the peace process -- which, otherwise may appear as Banquo's ghost at the negotiating table. For all its rhetoric, it is far more pragmatic in its approach toward Israel (and not really intent on "destroying" it), willing to negotiate with it, and most importantly, is not an Iranian proxy. If it were really such a disruptive force, it would have boycotted the 1993 Oslo Accord-stipulated 2006 elections. It has been suggested that the new Obama administration could show prudence by "incentivizing" this under-appreciated pragmatic aspect of Hamas, for ushering in peace and stability in the region. If President Obama is truly committed to the mantra of change, he has to achieve that in the US "Israel First" Mideast policy as well, questioning which is almost regarded to be an act of sacrilege. It remains to be seen to what extent the newly appointed US envoy for this volatile region, Senator George Mitchell, reputed to be even-handed and optimistic about resolving conflicts, can succeed in this regard. It must be recognized that the key to a broader Middle East settlement is the resolution of the Palestine-Israel conflict. At the moment Palestinian national unity is imperative, without which genuine peace would continue to be elusive, leading to the unraveling of the tenuous, non-negotiated truce, and the resumption of yet another round of carnage, the victims of which would again be the defenseless Palestinian people. For Israel, the alternative to the peace process is, either the reoccupation of Gaza, or ethnic cleansing, neither of which is a realistic option. The Arab leaders too need to overcome their disarray and division if they are to play a constructive role in regional politics; failure to do which may incur them the wrath of their own people, render their regimes insecure, and further complicate the political scenario. The bottom line is that, the intractable Palestine-Israel conflict cannot be solved militarily, but through a negotiated and inclusive peace deal acceptable and satisfying for all the parties concerned. Otherwise, there could be further escalation of conflict, polarization and radicalization of the region, which would not only affect the security of Israel's Arab allies, but of Israel itself and, in the long run, that of the United States' too. The author is a professor and chairperson of Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka.
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