Perilous security system of the world
From disarmament to arms control!
MANY countries around the world today possess or have the means to acquire weapons of mass destruction. They may be nuclear, chemical, biological or other types of weapons, which can be delivered through diversified ways. It is mainly the more powerful and wealthy nations that have such weapons although some poorer nations are also obtaining them. In recent years, there have been several movements and treaties to facilitate control of the flow and deployment of arms, be they landmines, small arms, or weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons though most of these are considered as controversial. Disarmament is now an issue that cannot be found even in a fairy tale now. Enactment of arms control
Arms control treaties and agreements are often seen as a way to avoid costly arms races which would prove counter-productive to national aims and future peace. Some are used as ways to stop the spread of certain military technologies (such as nuclear weaponry or missile technology) in return for assurances to potential developers that they will not be victims of those technologies. Additionally, some arms control agreements are entered to limit the damage done by warfare, especially to civilians and the environment, which is seen as bad for all participants regardless of who wins a war. While arms control treaties are seen by many peace proponents as a key tool against war, by the participants they are often seen as simply ways to limit the high costs of the development and building of weapons, and even reduce the costs associated with war itself. Arms control can even be a way of maintaining the viability of military action by limiting those weapons that would make war so costly and destructive as to make it no longer a viable tool for national policy. Enforcement of arms control
Enforcement of arms control agreements has proven difficult over time. Most agreements rely on the continued desire of the participants to abide by the terms to remain effective. Usually, when a nation no longer desires to abide by the terms, they usually will seek to either covertly circumvent the terms or to simply end their participation in the treaty. This was seen in Washington Naval Treaty (and the subsequent London Naval Treaty), where most participants sought to work around the limitations, some more legitimately than others. The United States developed better technology to get better performance from their ships while still working within the weight limits, the United Kingdom exploited a loop-hole in the terms, the Italians misrepresented the weight of their vessels, and when up against the limits, Japan simply left the treaty. The nations that violated the terms of the treaty did not suffer great consequences for their actions. Within little more than a decade, the treaty was abandoned. The Geneva Protocol has lasted longer and been more successful at being respected, but still nations violated it at will when they felt the need. Enforcement has been haphazard with measures more a matter of politics than adherence to the terms. This meant sanctions and other measures tended to be advocated against violators primarily by their natural political enemies, while violations had been ignored or given only token measures by their political allies. More recent arms control treaties have included more stringent terms on enforcement of violations as well as verification. This has been a major obstacle to effective enforcement, as violators often attempt to covertly circumvent the terms of the agreements. Verification is the process of determining whether or not a nation is complying with the terms of an agreement, and involves a combination of release of such information by participants as well as some way to allow participants to examine each other to verify that information. This often involves as much negotiation as the limits themselves, and in some cases questions of verification have led to the breakdown of treaty negotiations (for example, verification was cited as a major concern by opponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, ultimately not ratified by the United States). The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was designed to prevent testing of nuclear weapons and hence reduce the chance of an arms race. On October 13, 1999, the US Senate decided not to ratify the CTBT. This drew condemnation from the then US President Bill Clinton and his White House Administration as well as from various environmental groups, NGOs and other governments. Finally Bush administration set aside from the treaty and were pressing ahead, beyond international scrutiny and in defiance of the NPT, with the development of new generation nuclear weapons. The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT), better known as the Moscow Treaty represents an important element of the new strategic relationship between the United States and Russia with both parties agreeing to limit their nuclear arsenal to 17002200 operationally deployed warheads each. It was signed in Moscow on May 24, 2002. SORT came into force on June 1, 2003 after the Bush-Putin ratification in St. Petersburg, and expires in December 31, 2012. During the Cold War, it became clear to most people on both sides of the Iron Curtain that a continued arms race in an environment of brinkmanship would only lead to financial difficulties and would not solve the nuclear dilemma; hence, arms control. Consequently, advances in arms control have become customary norms for leaders in both Washington and Moscow; the Moscow Treaty is apparently George W. Bush's contribution to the process. Nuclear weapons and arms control treaties under pressure
All four major nuclear weapons treaties are under pressure. Some UN member nations are skeptical of the commitment from the United States on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Anti Ballistics Missile Treaty is under threat from the United States National Missile Defense Program. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was rejected by the US Senate and Russia initially stalled on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START II because of the American missile defense program. Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) for several years has been supported by the EU. UN's main aim is to strengthen the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the international effort to curb the spread of WMD. It is specifically aimed at nucleararmed states such as India, Pakistan and Israel, which are not party to the NPT. The US would back the FMCT in principle, but it would not support the inclusion of binding monitoring, verifying and inspecting provisions. Militarization and weaponization of outer space
The US is planning to develop weapons to ensure military dominance in space. This goes counter to the United Nations Outer Space Treaty that provides the legal framework for the use of space for peaceful purposes. A risk of an arms race increases when combined with the missile defense plans. The US is also risking abrogation of the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty by continuing with its Star Wars program, a national missile defense system. However, critics point out that the program is very expensive (largely paid for by the public), that the technologies are risky, that the threat rationale isn't very strong and that this will affect international relations, and could lead to an arms race. Nations may remain in a treaty while seeking to break the limits of that treaty as opposed to simply withdrawing from it. This is for two major reasons. * To openly defy an agreement. Even if one withdraws from it, it is often seen in a bad light politically and can carry diplomatic repercussions. * Additionally, if one remains in an agreement, competitors who are also participatory may be held to the limitations of the terms, while withdrawal releases your opponents to make the same developments you are making, limiting the advantage of that development. Several nuclear arms control treaties have been established so far but from the following fields it is clear that the treaties are not properly maintained even by the major nuclear weapons states. Process of arms control: stagnant or active?
We know that the very same US Government that went to war in Iraq because Saddam Hussein did not fully comply with UN weapons inspections unilaterally rejects similar control over its own WMD arsenal. Contrary to their responsibilities and legal obligations the G8 countries are still supplying weapons and munitions to irresponsible end users. The table shows the leading arms suppliers compared and the value of all arms deliveries to the world. As the more powerful countries show less commitment to reducing their own arms substantially and continue to pursue their own 'national interests', they affect many others around the world. This has led to an increase in resentment against them. One option for nations that feel threatened has been to improve their defensive capabilities and increase arms purchases and spending. Neighboring countries will often feel the pressure to keep up, 'just in case'. The military industrial complexes of the wealthier (and more powerful) nations will highlight how so many other countries have increased sophisticated weapons (often sold by the wealthier and more powerful nations!) and how that means that they should consider urgently increasing their own military spending and proliferation. An increase in arms leads to an arms race and increase in insecurity. By seeking a global halt to the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons, its wider aim is to reduce the chance of such materials being obtained by irresponsible regimes of non-state terror groups. Iranians and North Koreans are under intense US pressure to co-operate with inspectors from the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency but not so strict with India, which is controversial. To Bush, it seems, international verification procedures were a one-way street. The US places the safeguarding of an uncompromised American sovereignty ahead of global arms control. The US knows very well, any new treaty is all but unenforceable without effective monitoring and verification. "Inspections are essential" say arms control experts, if such treaties are to work. The US and the other nuclear weapon states appear content to place the safeguarding of an uncompromised, untrammeled American sovereignty ahead of effective global arms control. That is why the whole process of arms control becomes biased and stagnant. Reluctance in arms control is mainly because without nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons the stronger cannot otherwise exploit the weaker. The author is an analyst on International Relations.
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