Challenges for US in post-Musharraf phase
GENERAL Musharraf may have gone but even in his exit he seems to have left more uncertainties and problems in its wake for Pakistan.
Strategically, the challenges for the United States are far more stupendous both in relation to Afghanistan and the future of United States Pakistan relations. The strategic and political challenges for the United States are daunting, chiefly, because United States policies towards Pakistan were Musharraf-centric, Pakistan Army-centric, and ISI- centric. As a result while there is no 'power vacuum' in Pakistan with a civilian government in place there is definitely a 'strategic vacuum' for the United States in Pakistan. The United States is unsure and uncertain whether the new political dispensation in Pakistan will cooperate in United States 'war on terror' and assist in stabilization of Afghanistan.
Reports indicate that United States has obtained assurances from the Zardari-Gilani combine that Pakistan would continue to cooperate with the United States. But then the United States would know better that General Musharraf too had made similar pledges.
Pakistan: The Immediate Uncertainties
General Musharraf's exit will not provide a magic wand to the United States to re-order Pakistan in the mould that it would ideally like it to be. Nor would Musharraf's exit provide a magic wand to the top political leaders of Pakistan to transform Pakistan into a moderate, democratic and stable Islamic nation. More than the political and economic uncertainties that hover over Pakistan, the challenges of Islamic insurgency, Islamic militancy and suicide bombings not only challenge the state sovereignty of Pakistan but also the very identity of Pakistan This malaise has serious consequences both for Pakistan and so also for the United States overall strategic interests in the region. Pakistan people's expectations are at an all time high especially on the economic front and it is debatable whether both Asif Zardari and Nawas Sharif will be able to find time from their political chess-board games to alleviate the economic misery of the common Pakistani. The immediate politically divisive issues which could cause serious political uncertainties between the two top political leaders are (1) Choice of the next President (2) Clipping existing Presidential powers (3) Restoration of the former Chief Justice of Pakistan and 60 other sacked judges (4) The National Reconciliation Order which granted impunity to Musharraf and Zardari. This issue is likely to break the ruling coalition as the latter has a vested personal interest. Optimistically, both Zardari and Nawaz Sharrif can rise to the occasion and provide much needed unity amongst Pakistan's political parties. Then only democracy can survive in Pakistan. However, the pattern of past political developments in Pakistan point to the contrary. Both these leaders would be aware that while the new Pakistan Army Chief has kept the Army aside in the Musharraf-civilian political leaders' battles, the Pakistan Army would not be averse to interfere once again to "clean up the political and economic mess". Pakistan's top political leaders would also have to recognize that if future Pakistan Army military interventions are to be ruled out, now is the opportune time for them to forge national unity and bring Pakistan Army under firm civilian control. But it is a big political uncertainty whether Pakistan's political leaders can realize the urgency for such an unity. Pakistan's economic mess needs an immediate clean-up to pre-empt wide spread demonstrations on economic issues. In the first few months of the civilian governments existence no substantial moves are visible. Pakistan's most striking immediate uncertainty is whether the new civilian set-up would have the will to use power with unity of purpose to restore the writ of the Pakistani state in its frontier regions and also to act firmly against the Taliban and other Islamic Jihadi terrorist organizations which have sprouted all over Pakistan with the active connivance and support of the ISI. The Pakistan Army as the only logical instrument to stamp out the internal security challenges to Pakistan is unlikely to do so as the Islamic militants, Islamic terrorist groups etc. have all been spawned by the Pakistan Army and the ISI under its control. If that be so then the United States would be hard pressed to not only to ensure that its war effort in Afghanistan against the Taliban goes unimpeded but also to rein-in Pakistan Army and ISI's waywardness. General Kiyani may be Washington's man but then so was General Musharraf. US GWOT: Would Pakistan Assistance be active?
Analysis of this critical issue hinges on the consideration of some vital questions and the outcome of those questions. The following factors need to be pondered: (1) Pakistan Army and Pakistan as a whole have never viewed United States 'war on terror' as their own war on terrorism (2) United States 'war on terror' whether in Pakistan, Afghanistan or Iraq stands perceived as a war on Islam (3) Musharraf's rising unpopularity within Pakistan arose from a perception that he was an "American Stooge" (4) Taliban, Al Qaeda and other Islamic Jihadi organizations within Pakistan have grown only more stronger and potent in the last nine years despite Musharraf being in power (5) Pakistan Army is reluctant to undertake military operation in frontier regions. Operating against the backdrop of the above issues the questions that arise on whether Pakistan's new civilian set-up can provide active assistance to the United States 'war on terrorism' are as follows (1) Would the Pakistani civilian government have the political will to provide active assistance to the United States against the prevailing mood in Pakistan? (2) Even if the Pakistani civilian government has the political will to provide active assistance to USA, would the Pakistan Army loyally implement the Governments decision and militarily proceed against the Taliban and other Islamic Jihadi terror organizations that it has patronized for long years? Available indicators do not provide the optimism and promise that the successor civilian government of General Musharraf would either have the political will or the political control over the Pakistan Army to provide active Pakistani military or intelligence assistance to the United States 'war on terror'. Need one point out that after nine years and 12 billion US dollars in aid to Pakistan Army by the United States, Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden and Taliban continue to enjoy sanctuaries in Pakistan courtesy of the Pakistan Army. Pakistan Army's Military Priorities Already Re-defined
Pakistan Army Chief, General Kiyani, without awaiting the exit of General Musharraf had already made clear in June 2008 that the Pakistan Army had redefined its priorities in relation to the US 'war on terror'. This stands reflected in a recent Paper of this Author (SAAG Paper No. 2796 dated 5th August 2008) entitled "Pakistan Army Resumes Border Clashes: Political and Military Implications for India". General Kiyani had made the following assertions which signaled that the Pakistan Army henceforth did not wish to play any role in United States 'war or terror'. * He had told US & NATO officials that the Pakistan Army would not retrain or re-group forces to fight counter-insurgency war along Pakistan's western borders with Afghanistan. * Bulk of the Pakistan Army would be deployed on Pakistan's eastern frontiers with India. In the above situation, it stands further reinforced that should the civilian government in Pakistan be even inclined to assist the United States in its military operations in Afghanistan, the Pakistan Army Chief has his own priorities. The Pakistan Army Chief's assertions recounted above already find reflection in the increased border clashes provoked by the Pakistan Army in Kashmir since June 2008. Is there some coincidence? The United States could reasonably be expected to have factored the changed attitudes of the Pakistan Army in relation to supporting the US war on terror, but what the United States may not have factored-in is that Pakistan Army's most pressing priority is to regain or retain its control over Pakistan's foreign policy, Kashmir and Afghanistan. This stands analysed in the above quoted Paper of this Author. US Military Options on Afghanistan
During the course of the present discussion, two things should have been clear by now namely, that (1) Pakistan Army's contribution to US war on terror on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border under General Musharraf was the very minimal, just enough to escape a rap on his knuckles by the United States (2) The new Pakistan Army Chief, General Kiyani had unambiguously asserted in June 2008 that the Pakistan Army would not retrain or regroup for counter-insurgency duties in support of the United States on the Afghan-Pakistan border. The United States therefore, has serious strategic challenges in the conduct of military operations on the Afghan-Pakistan border in the post-Musharraf phase. It would be fair to assume that till the civilian government in Pakistan firmly establishes itself in Pakistan's governance, the situation for the United States will continue to remain fluid and uncertain. The United States would therefore be faced with the unwelcome prospect of unilaterally initiating military strikes within Pakistan's frontier regions against Taliban and Al Qaeda strongholds which provide bases for Taliban attacks in Afghanistan. The United States could also be provoked into launching Special Forces ground/aerial operations against Taliban strong holds in frontier regions of Pakistan. The United States in recent months has been prompted to undertakes such strikes within Pakistan territory and may now be inclined to intensify such operations should Pakistan's new civilian setup may not be in a position to provide active assistance to counter the Taliban. US Pakistan Future Relations
United States relations with Pakistan traditionally have been problematic in the last six decades. The basic problem is that Pakistan views its relationship with the United States on a single point agenda and that is how the United States can assist Pakistan to get the better of India strategically. The United States on the other hand views Pakistan as a small strategic speck on its global strategic radar. Pakistan's strategic importance to the United States therefore gets reduced to a given moment in time when it may have some strategic utility in the American global scheme of things. Beyond that all is rhetoric. Currently, Pakistan's strategic utility to USA arose from its use in relation to US military presence in Afghanistan and the stabilization of Afghanistan. In the current game, Pakistan Army overplayed its hand and double-played its hand. The results are for all to see. USA is now even unwilling to consider asylum for Musharraf. In terms of future perspectives it is difficult to fathom as to what strategic utility Pakistan or the Pakistan Army can provide to USA in its global strategic blueprint. The United States could strategically need Pakistan for its containment strategies against China but Pakistan is for all practical purposes a staunch Chinese ally and should Pakistan be forced to choose between the United States and China then Pakistan would choose China. The residual strategic interest that USA may be left with in Pakistan is that Pakistan somehow remains stable politically and economically so that Afghanistan remains insulated from any Pakistani turbulence. To that extent, the United States may use: * US strategic and political coercive power to ensure Pakistan's domestic situation remains stable which may include restraining Pakistan Army within defined limits. * Significant economic aid to Pakistan to assist it to ride out its economic mess and thereby preventing the Pakistani economic pressure cooker to blow the lid and cause political and social unrest. Concluding Observations
The United States in the pursuance of its Musharraf-centric and Pakistan Army-centric policy formulations landed itself in a strategic muddle where both the above said entities were working at cross-purposes with United States core strategic interests in Afghanistan. In the last two years or so hundreds of US and NATO soldiers lost their lives in Afghanistan as a result of direct acts of omission and commission by the Pakistan Army in not preventing Taliban ingress into Afghanistan. For far too long US strategic formulations have given an exaggerated over-sized strategic importance to Pakistan in their strategies. The future of US-Pakistan relations could turn for the better if USA downsizes Pakistan to its true strategic worth in its formulations. This is an edited version of the article. Courtesy South Asia Analysis Group.
General Musharraf's exit will not provide a magic wand to the United States to re-order Pakistan in the mould that it would ideally like it to be. Nor would Musharraf's exit provide a magic wand to the top political leaders of Pakistan to transform Pakistan into a moderate, democratic and stable Islamic nation. More than the political and economic uncertainties that hover over Pakistan, the challenges of Islamic insurgency, Islamic militancy and suicide bombings not only challenge the state sovereignty of Pakistan but also the very identity of Pakistan This malaise has serious consequences both for Pakistan and so also for the United States overall strategic interests in the region. Pakistan people's expectations are at an all time high especially on the economic front and it is debatable whether both Asif Zardari and Nawas Sharif will be able to find time from their political chess-board games to alleviate the economic misery of the common Pakistani. The immediate politically divisive issues which could cause serious political uncertainties between the two top political leaders are (1) Choice of the next President (2) Clipping existing Presidential powers (3) Restoration of the former Chief Justice of Pakistan and 60 other sacked judges (4) The National Reconciliation Order which granted impunity to Musharraf and Zardari. This issue is likely to break the ruling coalition as the latter has a vested personal interest. Optimistically, both Zardari and Nawaz Sharrif can rise to the occasion and provide much needed unity amongst Pakistan's political parties. Then only democracy can survive in Pakistan. However, the pattern of past political developments in Pakistan point to the contrary. Both these leaders would be aware that while the new Pakistan Army Chief has kept the Army aside in the Musharraf-civilian political leaders' battles, the Pakistan Army would not be averse to interfere once again to "clean up the political and economic mess". Pakistan's top political leaders would also have to recognize that if future Pakistan Army military interventions are to be ruled out, now is the opportune time for them to forge national unity and bring Pakistan Army under firm civilian control. But it is a big political uncertainty whether Pakistan's political leaders can realize the urgency for such an unity. Pakistan's economic mess needs an immediate clean-up to pre-empt wide spread demonstrations on economic issues. In the first few months of the civilian governments existence no substantial moves are visible. Pakistan's most striking immediate uncertainty is whether the new civilian set-up would have the will to use power with unity of purpose to restore the writ of the Pakistani state in its frontier regions and also to act firmly against the Taliban and other Islamic Jihadi terrorist organizations which have sprouted all over Pakistan with the active connivance and support of the ISI. The Pakistan Army as the only logical instrument to stamp out the internal security challenges to Pakistan is unlikely to do so as the Islamic militants, Islamic terrorist groups etc. have all been spawned by the Pakistan Army and the ISI under its control. If that be so then the United States would be hard pressed to not only to ensure that its war effort in Afghanistan against the Taliban goes unimpeded but also to rein-in Pakistan Army and ISI's waywardness. General Kiyani may be Washington's man but then so was General Musharraf. US GWOT: Would Pakistan Assistance be active?
Analysis of this critical issue hinges on the consideration of some vital questions and the outcome of those questions. The following factors need to be pondered: (1) Pakistan Army and Pakistan as a whole have never viewed United States 'war on terror' as their own war on terrorism (2) United States 'war on terror' whether in Pakistan, Afghanistan or Iraq stands perceived as a war on Islam (3) Musharraf's rising unpopularity within Pakistan arose from a perception that he was an "American Stooge" (4) Taliban, Al Qaeda and other Islamic Jihadi organizations within Pakistan have grown only more stronger and potent in the last nine years despite Musharraf being in power (5) Pakistan Army is reluctant to undertake military operation in frontier regions. Operating against the backdrop of the above issues the questions that arise on whether Pakistan's new civilian set-up can provide active assistance to the United States 'war on terrorism' are as follows (1) Would the Pakistani civilian government have the political will to provide active assistance to the United States against the prevailing mood in Pakistan? (2) Even if the Pakistani civilian government has the political will to provide active assistance to USA, would the Pakistan Army loyally implement the Governments decision and militarily proceed against the Taliban and other Islamic Jihadi terror organizations that it has patronized for long years? Available indicators do not provide the optimism and promise that the successor civilian government of General Musharraf would either have the political will or the political control over the Pakistan Army to provide active Pakistani military or intelligence assistance to the United States 'war on terror'. Need one point out that after nine years and 12 billion US dollars in aid to Pakistan Army by the United States, Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden and Taliban continue to enjoy sanctuaries in Pakistan courtesy of the Pakistan Army. Pakistan Army's Military Priorities Already Re-defined
Pakistan Army Chief, General Kiyani, without awaiting the exit of General Musharraf had already made clear in June 2008 that the Pakistan Army had redefined its priorities in relation to the US 'war on terror'. This stands reflected in a recent Paper of this Author (SAAG Paper No. 2796 dated 5th August 2008) entitled "Pakistan Army Resumes Border Clashes: Political and Military Implications for India". General Kiyani had made the following assertions which signaled that the Pakistan Army henceforth did not wish to play any role in United States 'war or terror'. * He had told US & NATO officials that the Pakistan Army would not retrain or re-group forces to fight counter-insurgency war along Pakistan's western borders with Afghanistan. * Bulk of the Pakistan Army would be deployed on Pakistan's eastern frontiers with India. In the above situation, it stands further reinforced that should the civilian government in Pakistan be even inclined to assist the United States in its military operations in Afghanistan, the Pakistan Army Chief has his own priorities. The Pakistan Army Chief's assertions recounted above already find reflection in the increased border clashes provoked by the Pakistan Army in Kashmir since June 2008. Is there some coincidence? The United States could reasonably be expected to have factored the changed attitudes of the Pakistan Army in relation to supporting the US war on terror, but what the United States may not have factored-in is that Pakistan Army's most pressing priority is to regain or retain its control over Pakistan's foreign policy, Kashmir and Afghanistan. This stands analysed in the above quoted Paper of this Author. US Military Options on Afghanistan
During the course of the present discussion, two things should have been clear by now namely, that (1) Pakistan Army's contribution to US war on terror on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border under General Musharraf was the very minimal, just enough to escape a rap on his knuckles by the United States (2) The new Pakistan Army Chief, General Kiyani had unambiguously asserted in June 2008 that the Pakistan Army would not retrain or regroup for counter-insurgency duties in support of the United States on the Afghan-Pakistan border. The United States therefore, has serious strategic challenges in the conduct of military operations on the Afghan-Pakistan border in the post-Musharraf phase. It would be fair to assume that till the civilian government in Pakistan firmly establishes itself in Pakistan's governance, the situation for the United States will continue to remain fluid and uncertain. The United States would therefore be faced with the unwelcome prospect of unilaterally initiating military strikes within Pakistan's frontier regions against Taliban and Al Qaeda strongholds which provide bases for Taliban attacks in Afghanistan. The United States could also be provoked into launching Special Forces ground/aerial operations against Taliban strong holds in frontier regions of Pakistan. The United States in recent months has been prompted to undertakes such strikes within Pakistan territory and may now be inclined to intensify such operations should Pakistan's new civilian setup may not be in a position to provide active assistance to counter the Taliban. US Pakistan Future Relations
United States relations with Pakistan traditionally have been problematic in the last six decades. The basic problem is that Pakistan views its relationship with the United States on a single point agenda and that is how the United States can assist Pakistan to get the better of India strategically. The United States on the other hand views Pakistan as a small strategic speck on its global strategic radar. Pakistan's strategic importance to the United States therefore gets reduced to a given moment in time when it may have some strategic utility in the American global scheme of things. Beyond that all is rhetoric. Currently, Pakistan's strategic utility to USA arose from its use in relation to US military presence in Afghanistan and the stabilization of Afghanistan. In the current game, Pakistan Army overplayed its hand and double-played its hand. The results are for all to see. USA is now even unwilling to consider asylum for Musharraf. In terms of future perspectives it is difficult to fathom as to what strategic utility Pakistan or the Pakistan Army can provide to USA in its global strategic blueprint. The United States could strategically need Pakistan for its containment strategies against China but Pakistan is for all practical purposes a staunch Chinese ally and should Pakistan be forced to choose between the United States and China then Pakistan would choose China. The residual strategic interest that USA may be left with in Pakistan is that Pakistan somehow remains stable politically and economically so that Afghanistan remains insulated from any Pakistani turbulence. To that extent, the United States may use: * US strategic and political coercive power to ensure Pakistan's domestic situation remains stable which may include restraining Pakistan Army within defined limits. * Significant economic aid to Pakistan to assist it to ride out its economic mess and thereby preventing the Pakistani economic pressure cooker to blow the lid and cause political and social unrest. Concluding Observations
The United States in the pursuance of its Musharraf-centric and Pakistan Army-centric policy formulations landed itself in a strategic muddle where both the above said entities were working at cross-purposes with United States core strategic interests in Afghanistan. In the last two years or so hundreds of US and NATO soldiers lost their lives in Afghanistan as a result of direct acts of omission and commission by the Pakistan Army in not preventing Taliban ingress into Afghanistan. For far too long US strategic formulations have given an exaggerated over-sized strategic importance to Pakistan in their strategies. The future of US-Pakistan relations could turn for the better if USA downsizes Pakistan to its true strategic worth in its formulations. This is an edited version of the article. Courtesy South Asia Analysis Group.
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