Bush: Facing failure in Iraq
What does Bush, the sole superpower's boss, do when failure in Iraq stares him starkly in the face? Like leaders under stress, he dissembles and spins; offers crumbs of concession disguised as the fruits of partial "success"; and generally tries to present a brave front against impending disaster. All these elements were present in Bush's nationwide TV address on Thursday 13 September on what he intends to do to extricate the US from the Iraq quagmire. DISSEMBLING
The time-honoured technique of shoring up one's base is to plead the nobility of one's cause. Just as Islamabad waxed lyrical in March '71 about maintaining the integrity of a disintegrating Pakistan, so did Bush try to place his crumbling Iraq adventure within a high moral context. He began his speech with stirring words. For "…all free nations, there come moments that decide the direction of a country and reveal the character of its people." Fair enough. And what pray is that moment? Why, it's nothing more than saving "Iraq's young democracy" from "…terrorists and extremists… at war with us around the world" that want "…to topple Iraq's government, dominate the region and attack us here at home." No kidding! How come Iraqi resistance that Rumsfeld dubbed as losers have been transformed into this formidable foe!! The only problem with this lofty Bushian rhetoric is that it is unadulterated hyperbole that fools few. Certainly, it has not stopped the Brits from vacating Basra city, handing over Basra province to Iraqis or altering their troop withdrawal timetable (2,500 out of 5,000 squaddies out next year). Launching the invasion from multiple base motives-- e.g. revenge for 9/11; imperial hubris; oil; further shoring up Israel's security et al was bad enough. But bungling the occupation compounded the error. While thousands of Iraqis have been killed, wounded or made refugees this barely causes Washington discomfort or a ripple in the US media; it's the mounting cost of US blood and treasure that's caused a huge domestic public backlash against Bush. His popularity is stuck at a dismal 30%. It was 80% on 1 May 2003 when he gave his infamous "Mission Accomplished" speech on carrier Abraham Lincoln. Failure extracts a price. CRUMBS OF CONCESSION
To placate mounting domestic dissatisfaction increasingly manifested in calls for partial or total withdrawal of GIs from Iraq, 54% want it immediately (Pew Report)-- Bush offered crumbs. About 2,200 Marines leaving the Sunni-dominated Anbar province in September '07 won't be replaced; a combat brigade (4,500 men) will go home by X'mas; and the remaining 20 combat brigades drop to 15 by next July. The base US troop strength in Iraq is 130,000. The main rationale for this limited phased draw down is the ostensible improvement in Iraq's security situation, especially in al Anbar province, a Sunni stronghold 200 kms west of Baghdad. There, tribal leaders from early 2006 began making overtures and allying themselves with US military whom they previously had resisted fiercely, for two reasons. First, their growing dislike of al-Qaeda's expanding influence in the province, borne out of attacking the GIs, which threatened to undercut traditional tribal power base. Added to this was the increasing revulsion both at al-Qaeda's bloody killings of fellow Iraqis epitomised by the delivery in baskets of the severed heads of five children of "uncooperative" tribal elders and its religious extremism. Second, and equally important, was the marginalization of Sunnis generally in the current Shia-dominated central government. The Anbar Sunnis don't recognize the Maliki administration. They are therefore willing to cooperate with US forces in order to increase their leverage over the Baghdad authorities. This cooperation was soothed by external money and persuasion, mainly from Riyadh, in order to protect its Sunni coreligionists and, more importantly, curb Tehran's influence, a common Saudi-US goal. The Anbar alliance can be considered a facet of the proxy war US is conducting against Iran. MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE
While this alliance may have pacified Anbar for the moment, it's difficult to see how this promotes sectarian cooperation or increases the centre's influence, both avowed US objectives. In fact, arming the Anbar Sunnis seems contrary to the policy of Iraqification under central control and probably stores big trouble for the future. It virtually invokes bloody confrontation between the Anbar leaders and the Baghdad government should power-sharing negotiations collapse and the latter decides to extend its writ there, though it may be some time before any central authority will have the will or capacity to do so. Besides, the Anbar Sunni-US alliance may be a wasting asset. It's likely that once the Sunnis have finished off the al-Qaeda remnants, they will turn their attention to the Americans, whose hated-occupier status will then once again occupy front stage, for the Sunnis can hardly relish being called collaborators. The current alliance thus is a marriage of convenience for both sides. It's worth noting that a September 2006 poll showed that 92% of Sunnis and 62% of Shias favour Sunni and Shia attacks against GIs, so much are they loathed as occupiers. The surge of 30,000 GIs in the past six months has not changed this statistic. A BBC, ABC News, and Japan's public broadcaster NHK poll released 10 September 2007 revealed 57% - including nearly all Sunnis and half of Shias - said attacks on coalition forces were acceptable. And 47% want US and coalition forces to leave Iraq immediately. Despite the Maliki government's parlous condition, the above data suggest that most Iraqis see the US forces as the problem, not the solution. Can Iraqis resolve their problems if the occupiers leave? The deliberations at a four-day summit in Helsinki held early this September is interesting. Sixteen ethnic Iraqi leaders exchanged ideas on reconciliation and governance with veteran peace negotiators from Sinn Fein, IRA and African National Congress. They issued the so-called Helsinki Agreement committing to disarming warring factions, power-sharing among ethnics and settling disputes peacefully. The summiteers stated that the vision uniting them is "… termination of the presence of foreign troops in Iraq through the completion of national sovereignty." In other words Yankee Go Home. In this goal, the Agreement reflects not only widespread Iraqi opinion but also the majority of the US public. The writing's on the wall: it's not if but how soon Washington abandons its lost Iraq war. Whether or not a substantial segment of this withdrawal takes place under Bush's administration is the question. To protect his legacy, Bush has given enough indication that he would like to leave this poisoned chalice for the new president in 2009. Conditions in Iraq may thwart him. The author is a free lancer.
For all latest news, follow The Daily Star's Google News channel.
Comments