Hong Kong 1997 and Bangladesh 2007
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Past imperfect, present tense and future conditional was how a departing British bureaucrat described Hong Kong in October 1997 on its reversion to PRC control. This is not a bad description of Bangladesh since 1971 and where it's now. PAST IMPERFECTOur past is not particularly noteworthy for positive achievements. We experienced the euphoria of independence in 1971; the satisfaction of global recognition from 1972-74; the trauma of BAKSAL in 1975; two military dictatorships over 1975-1991; and three civilian governments from 1991-2007 under two successive women PMs, a world record. The quality of governance over 1971-2007 was imperfect. Each administration was as bad or worse than its predecessor. It's a toss up whether the three civilian PMs were as bad or worse than the two presidential generals. But one thing is indisputable. The two ladies outclassed Sheikh Mujib and Abdus Sattar for bizarre behaviour and facilitating their kinsmen and associates feathering their nests and, by inference and at one remove, their own. Thus, no tears were shed for them or their henchmen when Emergency was declared. Good riddance to bad rubbish. The question arises: is something emerging under the prevailing civil-cum-military management that, in contrast with the past, could be more positive despite our sad experience of martial laws since 1958? PRESENT TENSE
The short answer is that the blueprint of the unfolding architecture is a work-in-progress. The resulting structure by definition cannot be brand new. Not all the political rubbish can be carted away - but more so a renovation and retrofit of an existing but creaky building. This effort has several distinctive components. One component is clearing away physical and overt debris (hardware). All authoritarian regimes do this initially, and do it reasonably well, because it's relatively easy. Mussolini boasted that he made the Italian railways run on time. Similarly, the CTG swiftly cleaned up the footpaths; demolished illegal structures; evicted squatters and the like. What this gained in improved civic appearance was lost in increased distress of the poor. No attempted good work is without its drawback. Newton's law applies to governance: every action has a reaction, not necessary equal and opposite. Another component is the more complex but relatively straightforward job of organizational revamping (software). The comic playhouse that was the EC and the anemic patient that was the ACC were beefed up and running more actively than before. Because it has a straightforward mandate, the ACC is more active. Rather than diffuse its efforts, it has chosen to investigate about 200 individuals who held positions of trust and influence directly or indirectly over the past 15 years or so. The most high profile individuals are the two 'netris'. They have been charged with corruption and arrested. Is this political vendetta or overdue house cleaning? The safe answer is that it's both. Anecdotal and published information suggest that much hanky-panky went on under both their administrations. Khaleda's shenanigans appear more glaring both because of their pervasive audacity and their more recent happening. While time may have dimmed the luster of Hasina's supposed misdeeds, they are no less potent. It's worth recalling her injudicious effort through a pliant parliament to assign expensive public property for perpetual use by her and her family. The years 1991 to 2007 saw abysmal governance. Surely the women supremos who ran the show bear considerable and ultimate responsibility for the fiasco. Far from expressing remorse for presiding over this descent into chaos, both ladies repeatedly disclaimed accountability. Khaled flatly denied her children and/or her/their associates were corrupt, despite the perceived and actual accounts of corruption (e.g. Hawa Bhavan) that discredited her regime. Hasina loudly trumpets the virtues of democracy, conveniently overlooking the fact that quite a lot of things she did (e.g. hartals) were self-defeating and unworthy of a democratically elected leader. Contrast their behaviour with that of Bush and Blair. Iraq cost Blair his job and Bush his popularity. In a parliamentary system, Bush would be toast by now. The point is actions, especially failures, have consequences for political leaders. Hasina and Khaleda consider themselves immune to this immutable law. In charging the 'netris', the CTG is taking a risk but one that's unavoidable if it's to carry out its self-imposed mandate of cleansing the Augean stables. If the charges don't stick, then the CTG and its backers are in trouble. So is the country. For then the normal acceptable institutions of governance - the political parties and the services/bureaucracy combination - will have been compromised and a dangerous vacuum will have emerged. From this perspective, the 'netris' trials are a defining moment in our political history, ensuring that their trial processes and verdicts will be keenly followed. By contrast to ACC, the EC's job is more complex, cerebral and creative in developing software for the future that has a material impact on how we do politics. The EC has a tough job in terms of operations and processes. Operationally, it has to register transparently about 90 million votersa big job at the best of times but now more so since so much is at stake. Process-wise, the EC has to change the pattern and profile of social behaviour by establishing and ensuring observance of ground rules on how political parties run themselves and how politicians fight forthcoming elections. These are contentious issues, not only in themselves, but also because of the lingering toxic effects of a past environment littered with unsavoury politics and grasping politicians. EC's plan to start discussions with political parties from 12 September is a hopeful development. The relaxation on the ban on indoor politics, one assumes, will facilitate the parties, specially the two big ones, to come up with constructive suggestions to ensure sensible elections in 2008. However, if the legacy of the two 'netris' conduct and statements are anything to go by, there is little hope that this will happen. Certainly, nothing prevents those AL and BNP leaders at large from putting on their thinking caps and mapping out their respective strategies of dialogue with the EC. Refusing to do so as their leaders are in jail is no excuse for not thinking. In any case, neither 'netri' is known for intellectual prowess. Thus, expecting any meaningful contribution from them is wishful thinking. FUTURE CONDITIONAL
By its very nature, the future remains conditional. In our case, it remains more so for two reasons. The first is the inherited burden of acute past misgovernance going back to our inception. Arguably, the failings of 1991-2007 differ in magnitude if not always in substance from those over 1971-1990. But size matters. A cancer detected early is more treatable before it spreads when drastic surgery is required. There's fairly general agreement that our body politic is in bad shape. And that desperate conditions call for desperate reform measures. The second of course is the quality and skill of the reformers. By ethos and training, the services lack the wherewithal to govern. But the Emergency has placed the generals in the driving seat. They have made the right noises and shown zeal for reform, relatively easy things to do. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. In practice, the CTG's performance despite its professed good intentions leaves something to be desired in terms of formulation, coordination and execution, especially in dealing with political reforms, inflation and pace of EC's work. The vexed but core question of political reforms has reached new heights of tension with Hasina's and Khaleda's arrest. The peak will be reached with the outcome of their trial. Hong Kong faced great uncertainties as 1997 approached. But Beijing and London handled the handover pragmatically. Thus, Hong Kong's economy is functioning smoothly since 1997, despite intense competition from emerging powerhouse Shanghai. Like Hong Kong in 1997, we face great uncertainty. Can and/or will the CTG and dispossessed politicians cooperate and show mutual restraint (e.g. avoiding NSC, dialoguing with EC) to handle our current tense situation pragmatically, so that the future post-Emergency environment, both structurally and institutionally, holds the promise of substantial improvement over the past? The author is a free lancer.
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