The end of the Abu Mazen track and the Olmert dilemma
CURRENTLY, both the Israeli and the US doctrines are to maintain the status quo. Both sides see eye to eye regarding the situation with the Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank and Syria.
There is also no difference in the perception of the relationship with Mahmoud Abbas. The Israeli policy is interested in continuing the dialogue with Abbas in order to have a free hand in striking the Hamas in Gaza. Israel is also interested in diminishing the influence of the Fatah as a political movement and to concentrate on the personality of Abbas as a leader, though an impotent one, who cannot impose his will on his own people, neither in the West Bank nor in the Gaza Strip.
In current talks with Abu Mazen, Israel aims to reach a framework agreement on all topics, including borders, Jerusalem, the refugees and the wall. In actuality, it is a paper or document that will have to materialize some time in the future, when the circumstances will permit.
It is therefore quite certain what the Israelis want to achieve from this dialogue with Abu Mazen. Consequently, Abbas' task is to finalize the framework document before the end of 2008, which will enable the Olmert Government to impress Israeli public opinion by claiming that he succeeded in reaching some achievements as a result of his talks with Abu Mazen.
In terms of security, this dialogue with Abu Mazen will give the Israeli security apparatus a free hand to strike the Hamas Movement in Gaza.
PM Ehud Olmert aims to achieve international support for his steps, mainly with the western European countries and the US. He argues that he is working toward progress with his Palestinian counterpart, Abu Mazen, and that he needs their support in containing Hamas, mainly through his militant policy towards the Palestinian population in Gaza.
Olmert wants further support for his strikes on civilian targets in Gaza by claiming that the military environment has been changed. Olmert and the Israeli military establishment need further support from the international community for their aggressive policy toward the Gaza population. Abu Mazen is playing a crucial role in that policy by holding a continuous dialogue with Israel. This gives legitimacy to Israel continuing with its current policy.
After his meeting with President George Bush in the White House (24 April 2008), Abu Mazen suddenly discovered that he would not get anything until the end of 2008. Not withstanding, this meeting in Washington with Condoleeza Rice was their eighth meeting since November 2007. In the beginning of May 2008 she came to the Middle East and met him once again. On the 14th of May, Bush met him during his visit to Israel.
Nevertheless, the main question remains. Why, although Abu Mazen realizes that his meetings with the Americans and the Israelis will not give him anything towards a solution, and at the same time is creating a split in the Palestinian camp, does he continue to meet them? The answer is that he has nowhere else to turn. At the same time, his perception of the international situation is that all the keys are in the hands of the US. Actually, the US has the ability to affect a solution, however, not on solving the issues but rather on neutralizing and torpedoing the issues.
The situations are the same in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, with the Palestinian-Israeli question and also with the Syrian-Israeli question.
Abu Mazen put all his eggs in the George Bush basket. Bush is using the Palestinian issue in order to tell Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States that he is trying to do something constructive in the region. He is using the Palestinian situation in order to get a free hand with his policy in the Gulf and the American presence in Iraq. Dealing with the Palestinian cause justifies the American intervention in Iraq and in the Gulf.
Actually, the current policy is the same US policy that has been in place since the 1980s when Martin Indyk invented the dual containment policy, which was meant to contain both Iraq and Iran, while at the same time giving the impression that they are trying to solve the Palestinian problem.
The current policy and the use of Abu Mazen is that same policy of one coin with two faces. Abu Mazen started to comprehend this, not only from the American side, but also from the Israeli side, which is not giving any sign of progress. Sooner or later he will experience disappointment from both the Americans and the Israelis.
The Mahmoud Abbas track, therefore, is on its way to its end. He finally understands this after his 24th of April meeting with President George Bush. He realized that this president will never implement his promises towards the Palestinians, will not apply the road map and never impose any pressure on Israel. He will just use the Palestinian issue as a pretext in his war against terror and his relationship with the rich Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.
The Quartet and its chairman Tony Blair are following the same policy. The London Conference of the 2nd of May in support of the Palestinians was just another part of that containment policy and its policy of continuing to finance the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The instability in the Israeli government and the accusations of corruption against Olmert will only prolong Israel's stagnation policy.
On 9 May 2008 everything was revealed. Ehud Olmert was accused of illegally getting funds from American Jewish businessman Moshe Talansky. Now begins Olmert's battle for his political life. Olmert's aim is to convince public opinion that those funds were legal and that Mr. Talansky was just a friend who worked with Olmert's close aid and legal advisor Uri Messer and his assistant Ms. Shula Zaken.
Olmert's strategy will be to fight and struggle strongly, while at the same time explaining the delivery of funds as part of the framework of local election campaigns from 1993 to 1998. His legal advisor will later argue that according to the Israeli political culture, all Israeli politicians have access to American Jewish funding by reminding us that Sharon, Barak and even Peres got such funds from the US.
According to Olmert's mentality, if he resigns it means that he confesses on all counts of the accusations against him. In that sense, as a lawyer, he will deny all the accusations and fight for clearing his name, even if it leads him to accuse his close legal aid and friend Uri Messer.
Olmert will also attack Talansky's personality and his motives. Later he will claim that this man's motivation came as a result of his ultra-Orthodox background and his desire to neutralize the peace process. Olmert will use the peace process as a pretext to protect his name.
Olmert can make many arguments for clearing his name, but he forgets two important factors: the media and public opinion. Today, at any moment, he can come under a strong media attack that could instigate Israeli public opinion against him. There is also the political and security system that could ignore him and start to perceive him as a lame duck. For example, they could treat him the same way as former President Katsav.
Olmert's strategy is to continue fighting legally and publicly. He already has 3 "Ivy League" lawyers who will push strongly to clear him of all accusations, especially the charge of receiving a bribe. He does not want to be remembered in the history of Israel as a Prime Minister who was removed from office as a result of a bribery accusation.
Olmert's current agenda is first to maintain his regime and personal political survival for at least one more year, and then second to influence who will inherit the leadership of the Kadima Party, especially not Tzipi Livni.
Deputy Prime Minister Livni is facing domestic problems as a result of not backing Olmert in this crisis. Olmert will try to survive as best he can, and at the same time try to prevent Tzipi Livni from taking power in his place. Achieving these two goals will be his main strategy for the coming months.
Concerning his political management of the Palestinians, Lebanese or Syrian tracks, nothing will happen in the coming months because he has no mandate to implement anything. There is even a possibility for escalation, mainly in Gaza and Lebanon.
In Gaza he might not agree to a cease fire, which would lead to an escalation. That would coincide with his government's agenda to divert attention from his domestic scandals. Even if he does agree to the cease fire with Hamas in Gaza he will escalate the violence in the West Bank, while at the same time trying to talk with Abu Mazen because the Palestinian President has receive direct instructions from the US.
Due to his domestic problems, it is in Olmert's interest to drag the negotiations with Mahmoud Abbas on forever. In addition, he will try to take the authority of the negotiations away from Tzipi Livni.
Concerning Gaza, as I stated before, Olmert might agree to the cease fire, although at the same time there is a great danger that he still might attack Gaza by ground in order to provoke a war.
Some specialists in Israeli affairs have claimed that Olmert has been aware of the police investigations against him since 2006. He initiated the Second Lebanon War in order to divert attention from his police investigations. Another question which might be raised as a result of Olmert's new legal situation and its international implications is what now becomes of Bush's promises of implementing the road map.
I can strongly argue that Olmert's new legal status will help Bush renege on his promise to implement the road map and establish a Palestinian State. Bush will now come to Israel and claim that the US will not interfere in Israel's domestic issues. As a result of these new circumstances and the status of Olmert as a lame duck, the US cannot deliver the Annapolis solution of a Palestinian State.
Any American solution and promise to the Palestinians and the Arabs will be gone with the wind.
For all latest news, follow The Daily Star's Google News channel.
Comments