Is Musharraf toast?
THE short answer is: yes. In war, the side losing the initiative risks defeat, especially when momentum shifts to the enemy. Despite Germany's spectacular victories from 1939-1941, Paulus's surrender at Stalingrad in February 1943 combined with the US entry into the war in December 1942 spelled Hitler's doom.
Stalingrad shattered the myth of Wehrmacht's invincibility. US entry meant Allied access to Washington's vast economic resources. The balance of power irrevocably shifted from the Axis to the Allies.
As a savvy general Musharraf knows this doctrine as well as anybody else though there is reason to believe that, in the Pakistan Army's tradition, he's more comfortable with tactical or short-term rather than strategic or long-term considerations and perspectives (e.g. the Kargil episode that was tactically noteworthy but strategically a disaster).
The reason is that the Pakistani forces fight on their inventory rather than on sustained production of or access to critical supplies e.g. POL, armaments et al. This factor rules out a prolonged conventional war. Islamabad lacks the mindset or capacity to wage a "peoples' war."
Loss of initiative
There are a number of reasons for which Musharraf has lost the initiative. First, there is the inevitable loss of credibility over time through acts of commission and omission. Musharraf usurped power in 1999; nine years is a long time in office. The Pakistani public and large elements of his constituency, e.g. serving and retired military officers, are suffering from Musharraf fatigue just as the country in 1968 suffered from Ayub exhaustion. While Stalingrad was a turning point, it still took the Allies over two years more to defeat the Germans. Musharraf's Stalingrad started inauspiciously enough. In March 2007 he suspended Chief Justice (CJ) Chowdhury after failing to browbeat him into resigning. The CJ's subsequent clearance by the Supreme Court and restoration to office on 20 July 2007 was a clear rebuff to Musharraf and showed he wasn't invincible. What finally pushed Musharraf over the cliff was when he, like the ex-commando he was, preempted the Supreme Court's widely expected rejection of the validity of his Presidential election on 6 October 2007 (he was also Army Chief when he won the election) by declaring an emergency on 3 November 2007. CJ Chowdhury and his Supreme Court colleagues ruled this as unconstitutional the same day. For their pains, Musharraf sacked the judges the same evening, using the 11th brigade to storm the Supreme Court building. This gave Musharraf some breathing space and time, but aroused a violent backlash in Pakistan and was condemned worldwide, including by his US protector though somewhat guardedly. Musharraf might have ridden out the firestorm on the back of a power sharing agreement with Benazir. But, as luck would have it, this became kaput with her assassination on 27 December 2007, probably by elements within or beholden to the ISI, the very agency that was Musharraf's ultimate power base. Whether or not Musharraf knew about the assassination, many Pakistanis hold him responsible. So not only had Musharraf become damaged goodfor his unconstitutional actions vis-à-vis the judiciarybut now he was beyond the pale for purportedly having blood on his hands. As the Chinese say, he had lost the mandate of heaven to rule. Momentum with the opposition
The assassination cramped Musharraf's initiative, and saw momentum swing to his mortal opponents, the PPP and PML-N. These two political parties swept the 18 February 2008 elections and made an alliance to form a government. Thus, a viable civilian institutional alternative has emerged to Musharraf that has snatched the initiative from him. Quite a change from early 2007 when Musharraf appeared indomitable! Some recent symbolic and material developments are important in themselves and collectively show that the politicians have the momentum and they, rather than Musharraf, would make the running and set the agenda. Thus, after much bickering, the alliance chose the Punjabi PPP stalwart Yousuf Reza Gilaniimprisoned by Musharraf in 2001 for five years on corruption charges -- as PM and was sworn in by Musharraf at his residence on 26 March. PPP and PNL-M bosses Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif pointedly boycotted the ceremony to show that they intend to sideline Musharraf. In a pointed rebuff to Musharraf, PM Gilani said: "We have to give supremacy to Parliament" and released CJ Chaudhury and other judges Musharraf had arrested. COS Gen. Ashfaq Kayani seems to be distancing himself from Musharraf. On 24 March he reassigned the Lahore and Mangla corps commanders (Lt. Gens. Shah and Akram) known to be close to Musharraf. Some senior retired Bangladeshi generals in Dhaka have been informed by their Pakistani contemporaries of army personnel furiously mending fences with the politicians! Everybody worships the rising sun. By the same token, few stalwarts remain on a sinking ship. One of Musharraf's loyal aides, Attorney General Malik Qayyum, resigned on 27 March. Perhaps the clearest evidence of Musharraf's precarious condition is the apparent change in US attitude. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte recently told Congress that Musharraf was an "indispensable" ally. Leaving Pakistan on 27 March after a three days visit, a chastened Negroponte remarked: "Any debate or any disposition as regards his (Musharraf's) status will have to be addressed by the internal Pakistani political process." This change is due to the frosty reception Negroponte got from the quarters in Pakistan that now matter. Nawaz Sharif was unable to give him "a commitment" on the war on terror, stating it was unacceptable that Pakistan had become a "killing field." Zardari adviser Hussain Haqqani remarked that "there was a new sheriff in town" and that "Americans …realized… they have talked with one man for too long." Supreme Court Bar Association Chairman Aitzaz Ahsan lectured Negroponte on why an independent judiciary was necessary to fight terrorism. The media excoriated Negroponte, accusing him of "crude diplomacy" (a TV commentator) and trying to "dictate terms" (Dawn). The 25 March editorial in The News read: "Hands Off Please, Uncle Sam." Let's hope Washington is not like the 18th century Bourbons, who learnt nothing and forgot nothing, and restructures its relationship with Islamabad that's more respectful of Pakistani sovereignty. The current master-slave relationship must go. Restoring the judges Musharraf ousted is an alliance priority. This should go through and add another nail to Musharraf's coffin. Expect him to resist this stoutly but probably to no avail. The above trend line suggests that Musharraf is either crisp or burnt toast. Not when but how he leaves voluntarily or forciblyis unclear. A deal whereby Musharraf leaves peaceably against immunity from prosecution makes sense, enabling Pakistan to bury the past and move on. The author is a freelancer.
There are a number of reasons for which Musharraf has lost the initiative. First, there is the inevitable loss of credibility over time through acts of commission and omission. Musharraf usurped power in 1999; nine years is a long time in office. The Pakistani public and large elements of his constituency, e.g. serving and retired military officers, are suffering from Musharraf fatigue just as the country in 1968 suffered from Ayub exhaustion. While Stalingrad was a turning point, it still took the Allies over two years more to defeat the Germans. Musharraf's Stalingrad started inauspiciously enough. In March 2007 he suspended Chief Justice (CJ) Chowdhury after failing to browbeat him into resigning. The CJ's subsequent clearance by the Supreme Court and restoration to office on 20 July 2007 was a clear rebuff to Musharraf and showed he wasn't invincible. What finally pushed Musharraf over the cliff was when he, like the ex-commando he was, preempted the Supreme Court's widely expected rejection of the validity of his Presidential election on 6 October 2007 (he was also Army Chief when he won the election) by declaring an emergency on 3 November 2007. CJ Chowdhury and his Supreme Court colleagues ruled this as unconstitutional the same day. For their pains, Musharraf sacked the judges the same evening, using the 11th brigade to storm the Supreme Court building. This gave Musharraf some breathing space and time, but aroused a violent backlash in Pakistan and was condemned worldwide, including by his US protector though somewhat guardedly. Musharraf might have ridden out the firestorm on the back of a power sharing agreement with Benazir. But, as luck would have it, this became kaput with her assassination on 27 December 2007, probably by elements within or beholden to the ISI, the very agency that was Musharraf's ultimate power base. Whether or not Musharraf knew about the assassination, many Pakistanis hold him responsible. So not only had Musharraf become damaged goodfor his unconstitutional actions vis-à-vis the judiciarybut now he was beyond the pale for purportedly having blood on his hands. As the Chinese say, he had lost the mandate of heaven to rule. Momentum with the opposition
The assassination cramped Musharraf's initiative, and saw momentum swing to his mortal opponents, the PPP and PML-N. These two political parties swept the 18 February 2008 elections and made an alliance to form a government. Thus, a viable civilian institutional alternative has emerged to Musharraf that has snatched the initiative from him. Quite a change from early 2007 when Musharraf appeared indomitable! Some recent symbolic and material developments are important in themselves and collectively show that the politicians have the momentum and they, rather than Musharraf, would make the running and set the agenda. Thus, after much bickering, the alliance chose the Punjabi PPP stalwart Yousuf Reza Gilaniimprisoned by Musharraf in 2001 for five years on corruption charges -- as PM and was sworn in by Musharraf at his residence on 26 March. PPP and PNL-M bosses Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif pointedly boycotted the ceremony to show that they intend to sideline Musharraf. In a pointed rebuff to Musharraf, PM Gilani said: "We have to give supremacy to Parliament" and released CJ Chaudhury and other judges Musharraf had arrested. COS Gen. Ashfaq Kayani seems to be distancing himself from Musharraf. On 24 March he reassigned the Lahore and Mangla corps commanders (Lt. Gens. Shah and Akram) known to be close to Musharraf. Some senior retired Bangladeshi generals in Dhaka have been informed by their Pakistani contemporaries of army personnel furiously mending fences with the politicians! Everybody worships the rising sun. By the same token, few stalwarts remain on a sinking ship. One of Musharraf's loyal aides, Attorney General Malik Qayyum, resigned on 27 March. Perhaps the clearest evidence of Musharraf's precarious condition is the apparent change in US attitude. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte recently told Congress that Musharraf was an "indispensable" ally. Leaving Pakistan on 27 March after a three days visit, a chastened Negroponte remarked: "Any debate or any disposition as regards his (Musharraf's) status will have to be addressed by the internal Pakistani political process." This change is due to the frosty reception Negroponte got from the quarters in Pakistan that now matter. Nawaz Sharif was unable to give him "a commitment" on the war on terror, stating it was unacceptable that Pakistan had become a "killing field." Zardari adviser Hussain Haqqani remarked that "there was a new sheriff in town" and that "Americans …realized… they have talked with one man for too long." Supreme Court Bar Association Chairman Aitzaz Ahsan lectured Negroponte on why an independent judiciary was necessary to fight terrorism. The media excoriated Negroponte, accusing him of "crude diplomacy" (a TV commentator) and trying to "dictate terms" (Dawn). The 25 March editorial in The News read: "Hands Off Please, Uncle Sam." Let's hope Washington is not like the 18th century Bourbons, who learnt nothing and forgot nothing, and restructures its relationship with Islamabad that's more respectful of Pakistani sovereignty. The current master-slave relationship must go. Restoring the judges Musharraf ousted is an alliance priority. This should go through and add another nail to Musharraf's coffin. Expect him to resist this stoutly but probably to no avail. The above trend line suggests that Musharraf is either crisp or burnt toast. Not when but how he leaves voluntarily or forciblyis unclear. A deal whereby Musharraf leaves peaceably against immunity from prosecution makes sense, enabling Pakistan to bury the past and move on. The author is a freelancer.
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