Endless negotiations, deterrence and balance of fear

Khaled Khalefeh

The Israeli security doctrine is currently in a total deadlock. The last Israeli incursion into Gabalia, in the northern part of Gaza, failed to achieve its goals. The Israeli government has realized the ineffectiveness of using its arms capabilities in civilian areas. The limited Israeli penetration caused 130 Palestinian casualties of which two-thirds were civilians. The military wing of Hamas, Ez Eldin El Qassam, however, fought strongly against two Israeli special units, battalions of the Givati and Golani Brigades. As a result of this fighting, the Israeli army is convinced that it needs at least 40,000 soldiers from the best Israeli special units in order to reoccupy the Gaza Strip. Former Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, in an interview with Kol Yisrael (8 March 2008), recognized this basic military fact. In response to another question about the military options, which Israel has to consider, Mofaz confessed that the best option is to continue with the current situation of "tit for tat" with Hamas, and to constantly strike Hamas on a daily basis. However, the Israeli doctrine of containing Hamas and destroying its regime in Gaza is continuing by all means. Israel interprets American and European sympathy as a green light for this policy. Israel also needs Abu Mazen in order to continue its containment policy against Hamas. Abu Mazen's condemnation of the Hamas doctrine is essential to the Israeli policy. The continuation of the dialogue with Abu Mazen is very crucial to the Olmert policy, not in order to push things that were left from Annapolis but to give legitimacy to the Israeli containment doctrine towards Gaza and Hamas. In that sense, Abu Mazen is a strategic actor who is helping Israel formulate and reshape its policy toward the Palestinians. Condoleeza Rice, the US Secretary of State, announced the restoration of the talks during her recent visit to Ramallah (5 March 2008, transcript of press conference between Condoleeza Rice and Tzipi Livni). The American Secretary of State did the Israeli policy a great favor by pressing Abu Mazen to rejoin the talks and to re-manipulate the American policy toward Egypt by reallocating $100 million to Cairo in order to play a role against Hamas. The Israeli side is backed by the American support of Ms. Rice, who came specially to bring Abu Mazen back to the talks, although he promised not to do so without a large-scale deal with Israel. Under the patronage of the US, the talks were restored on 14 March 2008. Barak did not participate in them, although PM Fiad did. Barak designated Lt. General Amos Gilad to represent him. General William Fraser represented the Americans. There is a great misperception, however, that the Palestinians continue to believe that they can get something during the short time that remains for the Bush Administration. The Palestinian Authority argues that if it makes more concessions to the US and Israel it can reach the strategic goal of implementing the road map. The US policy is far beyond that argument. It perceives the Palestinian issue as a security issue and not as a political one, which has to be solved in cooperation with the Israeli side. The US already has had three generals representing it by carrying out and monitoring any agreement, or even any possible minor agreement. General William Fraser is the latest general to be sent to the region by Ms. Rice. Before him was James Jones and before that, General Dayton, who was instructed to coordinate the military assistance with Mahamed Dahlan immediately after Hamas came into power in January 2006. Nevertheless, the current strategic agenda of the US and the Israeli government is to strengthen the Abu Mazen government by weakening the Hamas government in Gaza. For this reason, the US supports the Abu Mazen-Fiad Salam regime militarily and financially. Most of the assistance, however, goes to the high elite of the Mazen government without taking care of the many needs of the Palestinian people. Both the American and Israeli doctrines coincide with Abu Mazen's strategy of striking the Hamas regime. Abu Mazen is giving the cover of negotiations to the US and Israel, while the Europeans are paying lip service by visiting him in Ramallah and treating him as a sovereign leader. Analysts who are involved in the politics of the Palestinian Authority have revealed some resentment from the Israeli conduct toward the PA. They claim that the Hamas Movement is interested in making Abu Mazen irrelevant. With only minimum criticism, they believe that his political strength will decline sooner or later. Circles surrounding him have leaked to the public that he might freeze negotiations with Israel after he starts to realize that he was used as a tool for Israeli and American conduct. It is not certain that he will continue in the dialogue with the Israelis. However, it is rather certain that it will be very difficult to publicly continue with the negotiations if the Israeli army tries to occupy Gaza again. Concerning Gaza, Israel has to consider Mahmoud Abbas abandoning the negotiations if it starts a ground campaign. Israel also has to consider the eruption of another front in the northern part in Lebanon with Hezbollah, domestic unrest inside the West Bank and further harsh international reactions. No one can be sure of a decisive victory in a ground battle. Israel can start such a battle but it cannot assure the desired outcome. Furthermore, the launching of rockets may not be stopped. In addition, squeezing an entire civilian population to the corner might not be achievable in such an operation. Concerning Gaza and the Hamas regime, Israel does not recognize this regime and does not want to change the status quo of the Hamas Movement living under siege and under daily military attacks, all with the support of the world community. Israel diverts all the countries that want to support the Palestinians to the regime of Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah. Israel actually wants to strike in Gaza and at the same time, continue talks on an endless track with the Palestinian Authority under an international framework. This framework might be according to Annapolis or the Tony Blair Quartet or now according to the Angela Merkel proposal to hold an international conference in Berlin which will strengthen the role of Germany. Rationally, the current situation is strategically good for Israel. Israel is exerting pressure to maintain the current situation in Gaza of keeping the Hamas leadership under siege while continuing the dialogue with the Palestinian Authority, and at the same time presenting the problem of the Palestinians as an international problem that is related to Iran and Muslim extremists and not a nation who has equal rights in this country. Defense Minister Barak and the military establishment will not agree to this situation continuing indefinitely. They will exert pressure to change the status quo. Barak would like to maintain a positive balance of fear that will be favorable to Israel. That means that he will continue to strike both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to provide a pretext to react strongly against Hamas and its infrastructure. Nevertheless, as I previously explained, the choices are very difficult and the Palestinians will not agree to sit quietly forever. They want to change their standard of living and their prospects for the future. Consequently, Barak will continue to believe in deterrence on all fronts, in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. It is not certain whether the deterrence policy will continue to work in his favor or whether an escalation will occur on all fronts sometime soon.
The author is a journalist and member of The Arab Council for Foreign Relations.