<i>Pakistan elections: Some observations </i>

Most elections are cathartic, allowing society to let off steam. Some are transformational, like Ukraine's Orange Revolution and as the 2008 US presidential elections could be. Others have revolutionary impact: the 1970 elections in undivided Pakistan divided it, materially changing South Asian geopolitics. Pakistan's recent election reveals significant elements of catharsis, sizeable potential for transformation but meager scope for revolutionary change. CATHARSIS
The elections' conduct and outcome make Pakistanis rightly feel good. The steam built up in the pressure cooker of the politics of dictatorship threatening to blow the Pakistani state sky high has been released. Despite doubts, elections were peaceful. The public, restless for a long overdue change, demanded nothing less. But credit also goes to COS Gen. Kayani who, pulling out army officers from civilian duties, signalled the bureaucracy to be non-partisan. Kayani's motives included bridging the growing alienation between society and army and protecting GHQ's core institutional interests. Officers abandoned Musharraf because of his damaged reputation, just like Kurmitola in 1991 abandoned Ershad. The results revealed the Pakistani voters' maturity. They elected secular parties in all four provinces, ditching the religious ones as in the past, evidencing again if evidence was needed that religion is not material to political deliverance. TRANSFORMATION
The voters didn't give any party a clear majority. PPP won the most seats but mainly in Sindh. The next largest PML-N won in Punjab only. This bound PPP and PML-N to work together. While disparate manifestoes and conflicting personalities make coalition a shaky enterprise, it may be a blessing in disguise in Pakistan where ethnic tensions run deep and distrust of Punjab is rampant amongst smaller provinces. It'll force politicians to talk to each other and find common cause on tactical and strategic issues. Already this is happening. The PPP and PML-N, supported by ANP, will form a coalition with PPP's respected Makhdoom Amin Fahim rumoured as the putative PM. Restoring the sacked judges and sacking Musharraf being the two main points on the coalition's tactical agenda suggest that it intends to move quickly to reassert the substance of civilian rule. This may be easier said than done. Musharraf will fiercely contest judicial restoration, since this is the thin end of the wedge for the besieged president and fuel the momentum for his ouster if implemented. Even if judges are restoredwhich seems more likely than not-- ousting Musharraf may be tricky because of his lingering but potentially dwindling US and GHQ support. While powerful props, neither Washington nor army brass wants to be on history's wrong side. So the odds probably favour Musharraf leaving sooner rather than later. A coup de gracea swift orchestrated dignified resignationrather than death by a thousand cutsa messy impeachmentshould enable Pakistan to bury the past symbolically and move forward substantially. If neither of the above happens, then the coalition may cohabit with Musharraf under a power sharing arrangement whereby presidential powers e.g. dissolving NA are clipped and civilian supremacy established over time, if ever. Though not a happy prospect for Pakistani democracy, it would be tantamount to a victory of despotism over accountability. Moving on, since election victory euphoria is a wasting asset, the coalition's obvious strategic challenge is how it governs. For starters, Pakistan's fragile national unity needs strengthening. Thus, the Federation's centralised authoritarian rule should give way to substantial and overdue provincial autonomy to keep the Balochis, Pashtuns and Sindhis happy within and committed to Pakistan. Punjab will have to be less overbearing, and seen to be so. The Sindhi-Punjabi entente represented by the coalition offers the best chance of attaining this elusive objective. Economic management will continue as before but with more money for the provinces. The defence budget remains sacrosanct and grows modestly, especially if Musharraf's de facto rapprochement with Delhi eases border tensions and Indo-Pak commercial relations expand. Islamabad's shameful servility to Washington needs retuning to restore Pakistani honour, put relations on a more even keel, and enable more sustainable conduct of the so-called anachronistic war on terror as a US ally, especially since the religious rightists have been sidelined. The gratification of revanchist US goals in Afghanistan contributes to Pakistan's destabilisation by stoking Pashtun nationalism and irredentism. This requires a US/NATO reexamination of the basis and conduct of its increasingly dubious warmore like "occupation"in Afghanistan to seek dialogue with rather than extermination of the Taliban. After all, Afghanistan is their country, not a testing ground for arcane US counter-insurgency doctrine and weaponry. This review won't happen under Bushto do so would be to admit failure, as in Iraqbut it could be one of the major tasks of the new White House. REVOLUTIONARY
The elections shouldn't expect much change in who runs Pakistan and how. The rural feudals will still call the shots but a revitalised community of urban legal and right activists should be a potent force for social progress and secular change. Punjab will remain the dominant province. Punjabi-dominated army/bureaucracy will control the levers of power. But the likely first fruits of democracy is that Islamabad will be less heavy-handed and more high-handed; minorities' concerns will receive and carry greater weight and toxic levels of provincial and ethnic tensions should abate. Those in power have their job cut out in righting the listing and drifting Pakistani ship of state. A deft captain, skilful navigation and disciplined crew are essential for the vessel to reach harbour safely.
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