The Lebanon crisis
LEBANON is suffering from domestic political instability. At first it seems that this instability is a result of one side of the conflict, but in reality this conflict situation is related to the positions of the two sides, the Sinioran government and the opposition headed by Hezbollah. According to the constitution, the current government needs the support of two thirds of the members of Parliament plus one in order to form a new government. The Sinioran coalition and its associates, mainly Jared Eldan El Hariri, realized that they could not convince two-thirds of the 124 members of Parliament since they are trying to go against the constitution by forming a coalition led by Hezbollah who currently are only 52 members of Parliament. This effectively denies any chance of changing the constitution. However, as a compromise, Hezbollah has agreed to appoint Chief of Staff General Mechel Suliman as the new president and an agreed upon government of national unity with 10 ministers from Hezbollah, 10 ministers from the Sinioran faction and 10 ministers who would be appointed by the new president. The Sinioran government wants to exclude Hezbollah and its Christian ally led by General Michel On. Hezbollah's position is very solid in its rejection of any initiative that supports the Sinioran hegemony over Lebanon.
Consequently, the French initiative completely failed to achieve anything positive in Lebanon. Bernard Kouchner visited Lebanon four times without any results. Lebanon today has lost all its allies. The US is also losing leverage there, although they still have some influence over Harari and Siniora. These leaders are quickly losing a great deal of influence. They cannot move forward politically, nor can they translate any of their influence into control of the Parliament. Currently, the entire pro-Western block in Lebanon is losing influence. Even the Christians and especially the Maronites, are suffering from a real split. Michel On is a strategic ally of Hezbollah. Suliman Frangia, a very well known Maronite leader and supporter of Hezbollah, strongly attacked the Maronite patriarch last month.
Hezbollah, Michel On, Suliman Frangia (leader of the Marada Party), parts of the Sunnis in Tripoli and a small part of the Druze have formed the so-called opposition to the Siniora government.
Lebanon is currently suffering from a real political blockage. The Siniora government is not able to govern or promote the economy of the normal Lebanese. The army is also in a stagnant status. On January 27th, soldiers received orders from the government and shot to death Lebanese Shiite demonstrators. The Chief of Staff, Michel Suliman, defended this action by apologizing to Nabih Berry, the leader of "Amal". However, this incident shows that the Lebanese army is a vulnerable institution that mainly concentrates on the killing of innocent Lebanese citizens.
Political stability might be achieved in Lebanon only if the Siniora and Harari coalition recognizes that the opposition, represented by Hezbollah, is a serious partner for a national unity government, which would equal the same number of ministers but with a pro-Siniora-Harari president.
Until now, Hezbollah has succeeded in rejecting the American, French and Arab initiatives, all of which were based on the same ideas. Currently the French are losing influence in Lebanon and are perceived as an extension of the Americans and not as an historic friend and ally of the Lebanese.
Hezbollah has succeeded in neutralizing any initiative that ignored a national unity government. The Siniora government cannot act alone and independently in terms of partnership and cooperation in a coalition with Hezbollah. The stagnation will continue for a long time.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah is celebrating a great victory domestically with the publishing of the Vinograd Report. Hezbollah claims that this report proved the success of its strategic tactics in the last Lebanon War. This victory embarrasses the Sinoria government by claiming that Hezbollah had to consult with the government before kidnapping the two Israeli soldiers. The Chief of Staff Michel Suliman argued differently. He declared that the victory described in the Vinograd Report is a victory of the army and the Lebanese resistance.
The aftermath of Vinograd
The attention of the Israeli political system is currently focused on the Vinograd Commission's final findings. There is great debate in the Israeli public concerning the effects of the Second Lebanon War. Accusations between the military establishment and the Prime Minister's office have become very familiar. The first part of the Vinograd Report accused the Prime Minister of obviously being responsible for the failures of the war, including his decision to conduct such a war based on the circumstances of July 2006. The Commission claimed that they would not make any personal recommendations regarding the Prime Minister. They would, however, make general recommendations that would show who is responsible for the war and its failures. The second part of the report, however, would focus on the massive ground attack on the 11th of August 2006, which was ordered by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, although UN Resolution 1701 had already been decided upon by the Security Council. The ground battle was decided on after strong pressure from the military establishment and Defense Minister Amir Peretz. The military establishment decided to conduct a ground battle of hundreds of Merkava tanks based on the Litany River, which would be accomplished within 60 hours, from 6:00 pm on 11 August until 7:00 am 14 August 2006. According to security analysts, this was impossible. Others described it as an act of suicide, and this is exactly what happened as the IDF lost 33 soldiers and an unknown number of tanks in Wadi Slouky Valley when Hezbollah succeeded in ambushing the Israeli tanks and forcing the Israeli fighters to withdraw with heavy casualties. The main argument against Olmert, however, is that he should have acted differently as Prime Minister. He had to have realized that this ground battle was not necessary but was just to raise the ego, dignity and honor of some of the officers, such as Deputy Chief of Staff Kaplinsky, Chief of Staff Dan Halutz and the Defense Minister. Olmert did not understand the limits of force and the capabilities of the Hezbollah. He did not understand the entire military picture and the grand global picture of international dynamics after Resolution 1701 had been agreed upon. The five young officers who have called on Olmert to resign understand the military dilemma in which conventional armor and tanks cannot change the military field in South Lebanon. In order to change it, a country has to fight a guerilla war, and this is not something they have been trained to do. Olmert himself did not recognize this fact. Achieving something significant would require at least 2-3 months of fighting while taking heavy casualties. This is what Olmert did not want. Domestically, Olmert is being asked to pay for this by Israeli public opinion, which also did not ask for his Gaza fiasco on Wednesday, the 30th of January. Consequently, Olmert is perceived today, after these two major crises in Lebanon and in Gaza, as a disputed leader who started a war against Hezbollah in order to rescue two captured soldiers, which was not a life or death situation. The war cost thousands of casualties to the two sides. More importantly to Israel, however, Olmert led the army into a situation where it lost its deterrence in a crucial moment of strategic decline of US policy in the region. This battle might cost him his position. Olmert has lost his legitimacy to govern. This has become more apparent after the Vinograd Report. Even if he continues to govern he will be a real lame duck who cannot do any political maneuvering, neither with the Lebanese nor with the Palestinians. Livni, if she replaces him, will also be weak and also be unable to make any moves. She would be accused of having been part of the last battle. Both Olmert and Livni, even with the support of Barak, will not have the power to move things forward. Olmert submitted the complete decision making regarding the ground battle in Lebanon to the army. Actually, he surrendered to the military establishment and has done the same thing in the case of Gaza when the military establishment started the blockade campaign last June by using further targeted killings, incursions and bombardments. These actions created the last Palestinian exodus to Egypt. Actually, the Europeans and the Quartet have been following the policy of further pressure against the people of Gaza. Currently, any new policy that could be implemented in Gaza would exclude the Europeans and for sure the American side. Therefore, the new procedure at the border control in Gaza will not be the same as before. Both the Palestinians and the Egyptians will not agree to the precondition of a strong blockade against the Palestinians. It is also rather hard to imagine that the Europeans would be involved. Rather, it will be a Palestinian Egyptian deal, with procedures arranged with Israel. Notwithstanding efforts to disturb these procedures by continuing the bombing and targeted killing policies, there will be the new future of Gaza Israel relations. Israeli policy under Olmert has also led to the cancellation of the Paris Duty Agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis.
The attention of the Israeli political system is currently focused on the Vinograd Commission's final findings. There is great debate in the Israeli public concerning the effects of the Second Lebanon War. Accusations between the military establishment and the Prime Minister's office have become very familiar. The first part of the Vinograd Report accused the Prime Minister of obviously being responsible for the failures of the war, including his decision to conduct such a war based on the circumstances of July 2006. The Commission claimed that they would not make any personal recommendations regarding the Prime Minister. They would, however, make general recommendations that would show who is responsible for the war and its failures. The second part of the report, however, would focus on the massive ground attack on the 11th of August 2006, which was ordered by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, although UN Resolution 1701 had already been decided upon by the Security Council. The ground battle was decided on after strong pressure from the military establishment and Defense Minister Amir Peretz. The military establishment decided to conduct a ground battle of hundreds of Merkava tanks based on the Litany River, which would be accomplished within 60 hours, from 6:00 pm on 11 August until 7:00 am 14 August 2006. According to security analysts, this was impossible. Others described it as an act of suicide, and this is exactly what happened as the IDF lost 33 soldiers and an unknown number of tanks in Wadi Slouky Valley when Hezbollah succeeded in ambushing the Israeli tanks and forcing the Israeli fighters to withdraw with heavy casualties. The main argument against Olmert, however, is that he should have acted differently as Prime Minister. He had to have realized that this ground battle was not necessary but was just to raise the ego, dignity and honor of some of the officers, such as Deputy Chief of Staff Kaplinsky, Chief of Staff Dan Halutz and the Defense Minister. Olmert did not understand the limits of force and the capabilities of the Hezbollah. He did not understand the entire military picture and the grand global picture of international dynamics after Resolution 1701 had been agreed upon. The five young officers who have called on Olmert to resign understand the military dilemma in which conventional armor and tanks cannot change the military field in South Lebanon. In order to change it, a country has to fight a guerilla war, and this is not something they have been trained to do. Olmert himself did not recognize this fact. Achieving something significant would require at least 2-3 months of fighting while taking heavy casualties. This is what Olmert did not want. Domestically, Olmert is being asked to pay for this by Israeli public opinion, which also did not ask for his Gaza fiasco on Wednesday, the 30th of January. Consequently, Olmert is perceived today, after these two major crises in Lebanon and in Gaza, as a disputed leader who started a war against Hezbollah in order to rescue two captured soldiers, which was not a life or death situation. The war cost thousands of casualties to the two sides. More importantly to Israel, however, Olmert led the army into a situation where it lost its deterrence in a crucial moment of strategic decline of US policy in the region. This battle might cost him his position. Olmert has lost his legitimacy to govern. This has become more apparent after the Vinograd Report. Even if he continues to govern he will be a real lame duck who cannot do any political maneuvering, neither with the Lebanese nor with the Palestinians. Livni, if she replaces him, will also be weak and also be unable to make any moves. She would be accused of having been part of the last battle. Both Olmert and Livni, even with the support of Barak, will not have the power to move things forward. Olmert submitted the complete decision making regarding the ground battle in Lebanon to the army. Actually, he surrendered to the military establishment and has done the same thing in the case of Gaza when the military establishment started the blockade campaign last June by using further targeted killings, incursions and bombardments. These actions created the last Palestinian exodus to Egypt. Actually, the Europeans and the Quartet have been following the policy of further pressure against the people of Gaza. Currently, any new policy that could be implemented in Gaza would exclude the Europeans and for sure the American side. Therefore, the new procedure at the border control in Gaza will not be the same as before. Both the Palestinians and the Egyptians will not agree to the precondition of a strong blockade against the Palestinians. It is also rather hard to imagine that the Europeans would be involved. Rather, it will be a Palestinian Egyptian deal, with procedures arranged with Israel. Notwithstanding efforts to disturb these procedures by continuing the bombing and targeted killing policies, there will be the new future of Gaza Israel relations. Israeli policy under Olmert has also led to the cancellation of the Paris Duty Agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis.
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