Post Arab Spring realities

Photo: AFP
The drama unfolding in Arab world resembles a classic tragedy. The fear part is that a bunch of weakened, nearly-failed countries in the Middle East and North Africa would be a severe strategic threat for the regional and international orders. In most cases when Arab Spring-inspired demonstrations erupted, the natural inclination of most of the regimes was to repress them with decisive force. But there were restraints. The death toll has consequently remained below the threshold that might necessitate international action, while the atrocities which include torture, mutilations and rape have been conducted in a manner that enables plausible deniability. Despite some protestations to the contrary, these atrocities are not incidental or mistakes but are an integral part of the regime's modus operandi. The international community was now better informed of the regime's actions, and it was capable of taking forceful corrective measures. While the diplomatic course has proven futile, moral and political clarity on the part of the transatlantic alliance may require some operational ambiguity. The regional contextThe reality of democratic uprisings in the Arab world is much more complicated than the narrative makes it out to be. Beginning with Tunisia, spreading to Egypt and then to the Arabian Peninsula, the last year have seen widespread unrest in the Arab world. Three assumptions have been made about this unrest. Firstly, it represented broad-based popular opposition to existing governments, rather than representing the discontent of fragmented minoritiesin other words, that they were popular revolutions. Secondly, it assumed that these revolutions had as a common goal the creation of a democratic society. Thirdly, it assumed that the kind of democratic society they wanted was similar to European-American democracy, in other words, a constitutional system supporting Western democratic values. Building a political base requires modifying one's agenda. But when you start modifying your agenda, when you become pragmatic, you start to lose your supporters. Optimistic mass people will soon face the problem of disappointment throughout the region a problem built into that very region. Somehow there are great expectations about democracy in the region and around the world. Mass people are enjoying the traditional honeymoon period of freedom, during which all but the bitterest enemies of democracy will give their fate the benefit of the doubt. And then, sometime at the end of this year, things will get interesting. The Islamists have the benefit of decades of organisation, but the Arab Spring constitutes the first significant instance of modern organised Islamism moving from radical to less radical postures. The will of the people is an uncontested principle in the post-Arab spring era. The abortive attack on the region is a reminder that the rule of law is far from assured in North Africa and the Middle East following the Arab Spring. In Libya, clan rivalry and the presence of militant groups is an obstacle to the emergence of a national government with effective control of the territory. Countries in the region today range along a continuum from proto-democracies with an Islamist tinge to failed states and repressive dictatorships. Ultimately, stability in the Middle East rests upon how regional players like Turkey answer their own populations' demands in a responsible and timely manner. The blind side: The consequences
The Arab Spring has introduced new variables into a strategic context that was always precariously stable, at best. The long-standing Saudi-Iranian rivalry may spillover into new arenas, while countries such as Turkey, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates might be inclined to seek local allies in their attempts to safeguard their interests and balance risks. Without effective law enforcement, Libya, the Sinai, and elsewhere in the region are becoming a playground for organized crime and terrorist groups and promising to become a hub of political and communal instability affecting Israel, Turkey, and Iraq. The risks in North Africa stemming from state failure should, in short, be given higher priority the transatlantic policy dialogue. Some suggest that the Islamists will soon be replaced by secular and Western-oriented parties because of their economic failures. This is far from certain. However, Optimists could argue that setbacks are incidental to the larger forces shaping what is a truly revolutionary outcome in the region the end of Arab autocracy. Triangle: The United States, Europe and the Arab uprising
Western world seem at a loss as to how to craft an appropriate response to the countries of North Africa who are said to be in 'transition.' Undoubtedly the uprising in the Arab world has created an historical opportunity for Europe to assist the process in a significant way. Turning the region to its southeast into a stable, democratic, and economically sound area is obviously in Europe's interest. The EU must not be a passive spectator rather should be innovative .The masses that went to the streets in Tunisia, Egypt, the Gulf states, and Jordan confronted their regimes in the name of the values that Europe wanted these regimes to adopt. Whether or not EU-created instruments such as The European Neighborhood Policy of 2004 and The Union for the Mediterranean of 2008 contributed to the uprising in the Southeast Mediterranean, it is now a duty of the West, and especially the part of the EU that is geographically adjacent, to sustain the nascent process emerging in North Africa and the Middle East. On the other hand the United States is seen as a declining power, a bully, an ally, or a partner of convenience in the region. When democratic forces arose in Tuinisia and Egypt, it is alleged that the United States only joined the parade when the outcome was irreversible. The US now faces serious challenges to both of its primary strategic objectives: advancing regional stability while enhancing its own influence. Its laudable objective of serving as an honest broker in some of the Middle East's most intractable conflicts inevitably collides with the reality of having to deal with internal challenges to its own stability. The way ahead
The question remains whether the new surge in rhetoric, enthusiasm, and bureaucratic structures will given the tepid performance of the past decade translate into a capable civilian surge capacity on the ground when the world decides it needs to manage the next conflictive crisis. It is not too late to rescue a great idea: will the movement on political, economic, and social reform give birth a democratic Arab world? Arabian civil society deserves all Europe's attention and support. Human rights groups, civic initiatives and independent media need increased, continuous, and accessible assistance. The political opposition needs encouragement, expertise, and funding to develop its strategy for change, and the democratic movement has to be treated as Arab world's recognised representative in all European and international forums. The demographic youth bulge and the refusal of oligarch to surrender their control over resources were the actual impetuses of the Arab Spring. It must now move from piecemeal to comprehensive, from half-hearted to decisive. It is the only chance to prevent the looming permafrost in Arab world and give its brave citizens a hope of lasting spring.
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