United States' Afghan Conundrum and the Pakistani endgame

30 September 2011, 18:00 PM

Dr. Smruti S Pattanaik

THE allegation of United States linking ISI, the Pakistani spy agency to the September 13 attacks on the US Embassy and NATO headquarter does not come as a surprise to many keen observers of the region. Not many months ago it was revealed that the US had put ISI in its internal list on "terrorist and terrorist support entities". As the US relations with Pakistan deteriorate further Washington is increasing coming out in public about its assessment of Pakistan's complexity in war on terror. The rift between the two allies in the war on terror was simmering for quite some time and the Osama bin Laden's episode only split it wide open. The unilateral raid is the result and not cause of the US Pakistan growing rift. The downward spiral begun since the US special force consisting from Navy seals commando made a raid in September 2008 which created uproar in Pakistan. Later, there were media reports that this raid was authorized by President Bush. The US operation is now limited to drone attack which now is being operated from Afghanistan without intelligence input by Pakistan. Trouble between the two pertains to their endgame strategy in Afghanistan. After US announced its phased combat troop pullout by 2014 Pakistan preparation for the post withdrawal scenario gained pace. This planning for end game has been on tow with Pakistan's help in carrying out operation in selected tribal agencies. Such duplicity has been inherent to a strategy that allows Islamabad to receive massive US military aid that dominated US aid under the coalition support fund. The military equipment it received to fight terrorism also strengthen its conventional weapon capability. The US has off late put conditions to its aid in the hope of keeping the military in line. The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) in July submitted a report saying that out of 3 billion requested for 2012 for Pakistan, 88 per cent of the total aid committed under Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPA) of 2009 does not require Secretary of State Certification. This includes USD 1.3 b economic support fund and USD 1.1b for Pakistan Counterinsurgency capability fund and USD 155 million for four other programs. This does not include Coalition Support fund (CSF) disbursed separately by Pentagon. Certification involves only 3.5 million Foreign Military financing. This process of Certification has been superfluous at its best. This is evident from the fact that Secretary of the state Hillary Clinton provided this certification on March 18 while the US was preparing for unilateral raid on Osama's hideout in Pakistan. Though accusation and counter accusation has been part of recent US-Pakistan relations their dynamics have changed after the unilateral May raid. Pakistan cannot be publicly seen as towing the US dictation. Similarly after Osama's discovery US cannot continue with public pretension that Pakistan is delivering. Already USD 800 million aid has been suspended. US demand on Pakistan to take action against Haqqani network in bound to fall on deaf ears as Pakistan prepares for US exit. Many in Pakistan consider Haqqani network as "strategic asset" which it should not lose when the drawdown is so near. General Kiyani's statement that Pakistan would not do anything that will affect its 'national interest' finds resonance in such assessment of its foreign policy elite. In spite of suicide attacks on civilian targets as well as high profile attack on military interests that includes Mehran attack there is no sense of urgency to rein in these groups. Pakistan still maintains its posture on Haqqani group. It feels that this group loyal to Pakistan Army would create strategic space. It is not surprising the Jinnah Institute report on Afghanistan which includes the perception of foreign policy elites also echoes the sentiment of the military that US strategy in Afghanistan is 'counterproductive to Pakistan's interests'. It has asked the US to include both Quetta shura and the Haqqani network in the negotiation on future of Afghanistan. Rawalpindi is not elated about the Taliban and US talks that was underway without its knowledge and approval. Pakistan in the past has sabotaged reconciliation process where it feels it is sidelined. Whether it was the arrest of Mullah Baradar in the past, sheltering Osama in the garrison town or its refusal to take action against the Haqqani group Pakistan pursues a well calibrated strategy. This gets facilitated further by the US's confusion regarding its own Afghan strategy which is torn between department of State that wants to pursue reconciliation and Pentagon that harps on a military strategy. High profile attacks on US interest in Afghanistan that culminated in US embassy attack in Kabul reflects that Pakistan security establishment want to send a warning to the US on the prospects of any reconciliation process which disregards centrality of Pakistan. Though it has sufficient control over Quetta shura it does not have complete faith on its leaders. As the Taliban remains divided between the old and new generations, between the group willing to negotiate and the one that prefers a hard-line stance, so also their strategy. This confusion regarding their approach is clear from the reaction of the Taliban leadership to the High peace council chief Burhanuddin Rabbani's killing. Bridging the wedge between the non-Pushtuns and Pushtuns would become a serious problem after Rabbani's killing. If Haqqani group or elements supported by Pakistan are behind this brutal assassination then Pakistan endgame in Afghanistan would also remain a distant dream as also peace in Afghanistan. Both Taliban and other minority ethnic groups are vital to the stability and political reconciliation. Rabbani's assassination has dealt a serious blow to the nascent reconciliation process. His murder has left Afghanistan devoid of a leadership who is acceptable to ethnic minorities to negotiate peace with Pushtun for a power sharing arrangement. Afghanistan braces for an uncertain future with peace remaining as distant as it was before the 9/11. The writer is a Research Fellow, IDSA, New Delhi.