Israel's nuclear ambiguity: Time to come out of the closet
Left-Right: The Dimona Plutonium Nuclear Reactor. Photo: nuclearweaponarchive.org. The Dimona Nuclear Power Plant . Photo: palestinethinktank
IN recent Washington nuclear security conference, held on April of this year, US President Barack Obama stated that every county in the world should sign the international Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including Israel. Though Israel has signed the treaty, but its signature has yet to be ratified. Not only this recent remark of Obama, but also experts from both outside and inside Israel stressed that this is the high time for Israel to put an end to its policy of ambiguity and unveil its nuclear activities. Israel has been maintaining a nuclear weapons program covertly for more than five decades. As Israel's nuclear weapons have long been an open secret, this allows even to its adversaries to use it as an example for legitimizing their nuclear development. Also the countries like India and Pakistan successfully used the example of Israel's bombs to progress on their nuclear nonproliferation objectives. Many argue that, Israel gained nothing but criticism by maintaining a farce that no one believes. On the other hand, policymakers of Israel argued in favor of policy of opacity that if it unveils nuclear activities then it may stimulate nuclear proliferation in Middle East. By its ambiguous nuclear doctrine, Israel gets the benefit of being perceived as a nuclear power while at the same time not facing probable consequences from the international community. But situations and realities are changing. In this changed reality, Israel needs to rethink whether it will unveil its nuclear activities or not. Before discussing it, we should look back to the background of the nuclear development and known capacity of Israel's nuclear arsenal. Nuclear program of Israel was first revealed publicly on 13 December 1960 in an article of 'Time' magazine. After that a flood of media speculations followed the tacit nuclear agenda of Israel. After long 26 years, the first extensive details of the weapons program were revealed in the Sunday Times (London based) on 5 October 1986. That article was written based on the information provided by Mordechai Vanunu, a technician formerly employed at the Negev Nuclear Research Center near Dimona. Shortly after this revelation, Israel could kidnap Vanunu by its intelligence agency Mosad, but it could not seal the news which reached to the international world about the intensity and extensity of Israel's nuclear program. It's widely believed that Israel began its nuclear program in the mid-1950s. According to an estimate of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Israel possesses around 200 nuclear warheads. If it is the fact, then Israel would be the sixth-largest nuclear power. These warheads can be launched by air, by ground (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) or by sea. Experts say Israeli missiles can reach Libya, Iran, or Russia. It is also believed Israel has at least 100 bunker-busting laser-guided bombs or mini-nukes, which can penetrate underground targets like nuclear labs or storage facilities for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). It is interesting that though US governments overtly stated several times that Israel should ratify nuclear non-proliferation treaty, they have backed Israel to maintain its policy of ambiguity. In order to maintain this opacity, many voices were raised against Iran but not a single legislation concerning the nuclear program of Israel has been ever passed. Even the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) did not take any legal steps regarding authority and legality of this nuclear program. But recently, it seems that the course is changing. Firstly, in May of 2010, all of the members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty came into a consensus about the 1995 resolution which stated a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other WMD. Members of NPT also endorsed Israel's accession to the treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. For implementing 1995 resolution, UN Secretary General will appoint a facilitator to coordinate this process. Secondly, in forthcoming mid-September, International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Yukiya Amano is going to issue an unprecedented report on achieving progress toward Israel's accession to the NPT and placing its nuclear capabilities under IAEA safeguards. Apart from above mentioned two developments, Israel is facing another obstacle from a country that always backed it. The ambiguity of Israel's nuclear program was relevant in the past when the situation was based on understandings that the perception is satisfactory and the US could live with it. Moreover, the perception of inexplicitness is good when no one in the Middle East comes close to nuclear capabilities, and up until the 1990s, Israel had no interest in discussing the nuclear issue because it proclaimed that it was irrelevant. There were only limited Iraqi and Syrian plans, not an international campaign; this is a classic situation for ambiguity. Now, the situation has changed, particularly in light of the Iranian race to nuclear capabilities. Israel should consider what is most effective in terms of the balance of terror and the Israeli and American public opinion as US is no longer satisfied with the vagueness, and Obama wants to push Israel to become successful in peace process. Within years, Iran can be a nuclear power, and Israel should consider lifting the ambiguity in the face of an Iranian threat, thus creating a clear balance of terror. To handle these upcoming developments, there are three-fold steps that Israel can take. Firstly, Israel should provide adequate information about the command and control, size and nonproliferation objectives of its nuclear arsenals. As other non-NPT nuclear powers--India and Pakistan--had already done that but doing so would reassure the international community about nuclear program of Israel. Secondly, Israel has already vowed its intention to pursue civilian nuclear energy; it should sign a safeguard agreement with the IAEA covering all existing or future civilian nuclear facilities. India signed a similar accord with IAEA in 2008, which allowed it to receive international support for its peaceful civilian nuclear reactors. Finally, Israel should reverse its existing policy and participate in legitimate international forums where the issues of a nuclear-weapon- and WMD-free Middle East are debated. In addition, Israeli diplomats should openly discuss their country's nuclear intentions and objectives, and either oppose or defend the 1995 resolution. If Israel can earn the good-faith in multilateral efforts to control and safeguard Weapons of Mass Destruction in Middle East, it can have also a voice in the debate of nuclear nonproliferation. Besides, it is not likely that revelation of nuclear program will cause any diplomatic isolation for Israel. Also, Ambiguity or disclosure of Israel's nuclear program does not make any difference for proliferation in the region. Iran will continue its endeavor to be a nuclear power, whether Israel runs its nuclear program overtly or covertly. So, if Israel confirms a fact taken for granted by its friends and adversaries alike, it can get a strong foot on the politics of Middle East. But, as past records show, Israel always believes in coercive rather than peaceful policies, so it is less likely that Israel will end its policy of opacity. Instead, though it is the high time to divulge the nuclear program, Israel can enhance its nuclear capability clandestinely to deter the possible nuclear threat from Iran.
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