'Confusion about NSC' - A rejoinder
Considering the vacillation since last May whether a National Security Council (NSC) was to be or not to be, one expected Brig. Gen. Shafaat Ahmed's (retd.) article "Confusion about National Security Council" to elucidate the compulsions for setting up a NSC (DS Strategic Issues, Saturday 11 August).
Regrettably, not only doesn't it do so but it also adds to the "confusion", for two reasons.
The first is that the article is full of generalizations and platitudes, especially from paragraphs 3 to 6. Thus paragraph 4 refers to "…incidences in the past where our governments have not been able to react properly or reacted too late…because there is no [coordinating] body in the government [to]… provides accumulated information or intelligence."
Superficially, this seems a valid point. But without concrete examples of such incidences, its merit can't be assessed.
Similar is the author's conclusion (paragraph 8, lines 1 and 2), "the requirement of National Security Council is legitimate and justified and the Government should immediately move to set it up." The wish is the father of the thought here. If wishes were horses, wouldn't beggars ride?
The second reason is the floating of the vague and ambiguous idea that there is a "lack of strategic culture in our policy making" (para.7, line 1) as the rationale for the NSC. This is a red herring if ever there was one and will be analysed in what follows.
What is "strategic culture"?
Nowhere in the article does the author define "strategic culture." (By inference, is there something called "tactical culture?"). In fact, he springs this concept upon us as a surprise quite late in the essay, in paragraph 7. The earlier six paragraphs do not contain any indication that would lead the reader to expect any reference to the "lack of strategic culture" as a critically missing ingredient in our governance. In paragraph 7, Brig. Ahmed states emphatically that "both…our politicians and bureaucrats" lack this "culture." He may be right, but only if we know what yardstick he's using. But it does not follow from this absence that "strategic culture" is present amongst the members of the armed services, which is what the Brigadier is implying. If that's his intention, then he should make this point explicit with supporting examples and give his reasons without beating about the bush. Merely to assert or infer is neither sufficient nor persuasive. What's needed is hard empirical evidence. In the absence of such evidence, it's permissible then to speculate as to what may or may not constitute "strategic culture". It surely does not refer to spit and polish, shiny brass buttons, smart turnout et al. These characteristics have their place in a professional army. But the final word on the irrelevance of these characteristics in decision making is the WWI put-down of Field Marshal Douglas Haig by Brit PM David Lloyd-George when he chided that the military "…must not make the mistake of thinking that the seat of intelligence is in the chin!" From this, we can conclude that "strategic culture" refers to something cerebral not muscular, of the mind and related to the quality of thought processes, an appreciation and understanding of the big or large policy issues or considerations that national policy makers have to evaluate while researching or taking core decisions. For example, we can buy arms from PRC but entering into a formal military alliance would be injudicious. Landlocked Nepal can't even buy arms from Beijing without attracting Indian sanctions. Colombo has got arms and training from Islamabad despite Delhi's ire. But by definition, the training and education of contemporary service officers don't make them privy to "strategic culture." Their training is how to fight conflicts and wars of all kinds that are evolving and changing (e.g. conventional to irregular to asymmetric warfareKorea, Vietnam and Iraq are examples). Their higher military education at the staff and defense colleges is geared to this narrow but important goal, not statecraft. It is only when these officers reach high command at the field or HQ level that the more senior ones amongst them are exposed to the complex, complementary and interlocking interaction of the material forces of domestic politics, external diplomacy and economic resources that impinge upon military capability including planning and conducting operations. There is every reason to believe that all worthy armed services are guided by these eternally pragmatic considerations that Thucydides elaborated in his timeless masterpiece The Peloponnesian War, especially his brutally frank Melian dialogue (The strong take what they can. The weak suffer what they must). There is no reason to expect that the Bangladesh defense forces are exempt from their application. It would have helped had the writer given examples of countries possessing "strategic culture." Within living memory and amongst our neighbours, we see the marked divergence in performance of the Indian and Pakistani armies dominated by the Punjabi "martial race" and presumably possessing "strategic culture." Delhi has kept its brass subordinate to the civilians, so that the three services can concentrate on strengthening their professionalism. GHQ Rawalpindi decided soon after 1947 that running Pakistan was its rightful role. The result: Pakistan army scored goalless draws in 1948 and 1965; lost in 1971 and got nowhere with unconventional raids (Kargil). These are poor returns on vast investment but worse followed. The Pakistani generals have run the country into a quagmire while creating ABRI under Suharto, a vast unaccountable economic empire (see Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military EconomyAyesha Siddiqa). Theirs is an example to avoid, not emulate. Societies that may have had a high level of "strategic culture" have not necessarily performed well. Militarized Sparta crumbled while pesky Athens survived to bequeath the world the notion of governance by democracy. The Mongols forged an unbeatable war machine but left little durable. In more recent times, Prussia is the example par excellence of an army with a state. But the Hohenzollerns greatest achievements were by civilian Iron Chancellor Bismarck. He crafted sensible not vengeful peace treaties that endured following Moltke's victories of Sadowa (1865) and Sedan (1870), vividly illustrating Clausewitz's dictum that war is the continuation of politics/diplomacy by other means. Emperor Kaiser Wilhelm overreached himself in 1914 and saw his dynasty disappear. But the German General Staff survived Versailles and willingly served Hitler, only to see itself and Germany destroyed in 1945. Perhaps the article's most contentious assertion is in paragraph 8, which states: "In a country which lacks strategic culture, the Armed Forces have a vital role to play." It depends upon what is meant by "vital." Defending the country from external attack, tackling major internal security threats e.g. CHT insurgency and/or aiding civil power to deal with disturbances are legitimate roles. But if by "vital" is meant the armed forces running the country directly (e.g. Pakistan), covertly (our CTG) or statutorily through an NSC (e.g. Turkey), then this is to invite trouble voluntarily, like picking up a stone to drop at one's feet. There is a red line not to be crossed. And if crossed, it's prudent to withdraw sooner rather than later. The two military governments we had from 1975 to 1991 left the body politic scarred. Neither Zia nor Ershad set up an NSCthey didn't have to, having all the power they wanted or neededdespite the CHT insurgency though Ershad briefly toyed with the idea. Unlike arch-schemer Ershad, Kurmitola stumbled on to the Emergency more by accident than design, an outgrowth mainly attributable to prolonged misrule by vainglorious and recklessly corrupt political leaders and associates who should have known and done better. Despite enjoying a fair measure of public support, the brass hats have discovered unsurprisingly that to run and/or reform a ship of state, especially one as fractiously corrupt as ours, isn't easy. But having stepped into the breach with a reformist agenda and zeal that enjoy reasonable public backing, they also can't just walk away. Unanticipated challenges like inflation, nature and protracted difficulty in sidelining the two "netris", despite their perceived and actual culpability (for example, Khaleda's tax dodging that distributing saris in Sirajganj won't expiate), suggest that good intentions in statecraft are not enough. What matters is performance. Judged by this yardstick, there is scope to improve the structure, texture and execution of CTG's governance, especially in tackling the unavoidably necessary but thorny question of political reforms. The CTG is in the unenviable position of riding a tiger and dismounting safely. It needs all the help it can get, for the blowback from a blotched intervention could be unacceptably high for a fragile society and state. Having said this, it's doubtful if setting up an NSC would be a panacea or enable the above problems to be dealt with either greater efficacy or efficiency. Certainly inflation respects neither mufti nor khaki. It affects all unequivocally though not equally. It would be a pity if Kurmitola were to overlook the debilitating outcomes of past and contemporary domestic and external examples of military governance, and undertook the palpably profitless exercise of flirting with the idea of, or actually setting up, an NSC. Shouldn't biting not once but twice over 1975--1991 be enough to make one shy? If we have any "culture" that's "strategic", it's agriculture, the backbone of our economy. The author is a free lancer.
Nowhere in the article does the author define "strategic culture." (By inference, is there something called "tactical culture?"). In fact, he springs this concept upon us as a surprise quite late in the essay, in paragraph 7. The earlier six paragraphs do not contain any indication that would lead the reader to expect any reference to the "lack of strategic culture" as a critically missing ingredient in our governance. In paragraph 7, Brig. Ahmed states emphatically that "both…our politicians and bureaucrats" lack this "culture." He may be right, but only if we know what yardstick he's using. But it does not follow from this absence that "strategic culture" is present amongst the members of the armed services, which is what the Brigadier is implying. If that's his intention, then he should make this point explicit with supporting examples and give his reasons without beating about the bush. Merely to assert or infer is neither sufficient nor persuasive. What's needed is hard empirical evidence. In the absence of such evidence, it's permissible then to speculate as to what may or may not constitute "strategic culture". It surely does not refer to spit and polish, shiny brass buttons, smart turnout et al. These characteristics have their place in a professional army. But the final word on the irrelevance of these characteristics in decision making is the WWI put-down of Field Marshal Douglas Haig by Brit PM David Lloyd-George when he chided that the military "…must not make the mistake of thinking that the seat of intelligence is in the chin!" From this, we can conclude that "strategic culture" refers to something cerebral not muscular, of the mind and related to the quality of thought processes, an appreciation and understanding of the big or large policy issues or considerations that national policy makers have to evaluate while researching or taking core decisions. For example, we can buy arms from PRC but entering into a formal military alliance would be injudicious. Landlocked Nepal can't even buy arms from Beijing without attracting Indian sanctions. Colombo has got arms and training from Islamabad despite Delhi's ire. But by definition, the training and education of contemporary service officers don't make them privy to "strategic culture." Their training is how to fight conflicts and wars of all kinds that are evolving and changing (e.g. conventional to irregular to asymmetric warfareKorea, Vietnam and Iraq are examples). Their higher military education at the staff and defense colleges is geared to this narrow but important goal, not statecraft. It is only when these officers reach high command at the field or HQ level that the more senior ones amongst them are exposed to the complex, complementary and interlocking interaction of the material forces of domestic politics, external diplomacy and economic resources that impinge upon military capability including planning and conducting operations. There is every reason to believe that all worthy armed services are guided by these eternally pragmatic considerations that Thucydides elaborated in his timeless masterpiece The Peloponnesian War, especially his brutally frank Melian dialogue (The strong take what they can. The weak suffer what they must). There is no reason to expect that the Bangladesh defense forces are exempt from their application. It would have helped had the writer given examples of countries possessing "strategic culture." Within living memory and amongst our neighbours, we see the marked divergence in performance of the Indian and Pakistani armies dominated by the Punjabi "martial race" and presumably possessing "strategic culture." Delhi has kept its brass subordinate to the civilians, so that the three services can concentrate on strengthening their professionalism. GHQ Rawalpindi decided soon after 1947 that running Pakistan was its rightful role. The result: Pakistan army scored goalless draws in 1948 and 1965; lost in 1971 and got nowhere with unconventional raids (Kargil). These are poor returns on vast investment but worse followed. The Pakistani generals have run the country into a quagmire while creating ABRI under Suharto, a vast unaccountable economic empire (see Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military EconomyAyesha Siddiqa). Theirs is an example to avoid, not emulate. Societies that may have had a high level of "strategic culture" have not necessarily performed well. Militarized Sparta crumbled while pesky Athens survived to bequeath the world the notion of governance by democracy. The Mongols forged an unbeatable war machine but left little durable. In more recent times, Prussia is the example par excellence of an army with a state. But the Hohenzollerns greatest achievements were by civilian Iron Chancellor Bismarck. He crafted sensible not vengeful peace treaties that endured following Moltke's victories of Sadowa (1865) and Sedan (1870), vividly illustrating Clausewitz's dictum that war is the continuation of politics/diplomacy by other means. Emperor Kaiser Wilhelm overreached himself in 1914 and saw his dynasty disappear. But the German General Staff survived Versailles and willingly served Hitler, only to see itself and Germany destroyed in 1945. Perhaps the article's most contentious assertion is in paragraph 8, which states: "In a country which lacks strategic culture, the Armed Forces have a vital role to play." It depends upon what is meant by "vital." Defending the country from external attack, tackling major internal security threats e.g. CHT insurgency and/or aiding civil power to deal with disturbances are legitimate roles. But if by "vital" is meant the armed forces running the country directly (e.g. Pakistan), covertly (our CTG) or statutorily through an NSC (e.g. Turkey), then this is to invite trouble voluntarily, like picking up a stone to drop at one's feet. There is a red line not to be crossed. And if crossed, it's prudent to withdraw sooner rather than later. The two military governments we had from 1975 to 1991 left the body politic scarred. Neither Zia nor Ershad set up an NSCthey didn't have to, having all the power they wanted or neededdespite the CHT insurgency though Ershad briefly toyed with the idea. Unlike arch-schemer Ershad, Kurmitola stumbled on to the Emergency more by accident than design, an outgrowth mainly attributable to prolonged misrule by vainglorious and recklessly corrupt political leaders and associates who should have known and done better. Despite enjoying a fair measure of public support, the brass hats have discovered unsurprisingly that to run and/or reform a ship of state, especially one as fractiously corrupt as ours, isn't easy. But having stepped into the breach with a reformist agenda and zeal that enjoy reasonable public backing, they also can't just walk away. Unanticipated challenges like inflation, nature and protracted difficulty in sidelining the two "netris", despite their perceived and actual culpability (for example, Khaleda's tax dodging that distributing saris in Sirajganj won't expiate), suggest that good intentions in statecraft are not enough. What matters is performance. Judged by this yardstick, there is scope to improve the structure, texture and execution of CTG's governance, especially in tackling the unavoidably necessary but thorny question of political reforms. The CTG is in the unenviable position of riding a tiger and dismounting safely. It needs all the help it can get, for the blowback from a blotched intervention could be unacceptably high for a fragile society and state. Having said this, it's doubtful if setting up an NSC would be a panacea or enable the above problems to be dealt with either greater efficacy or efficiency. Certainly inflation respects neither mufti nor khaki. It affects all unequivocally though not equally. It would be a pity if Kurmitola were to overlook the debilitating outcomes of past and contemporary domestic and external examples of military governance, and undertook the palpably profitless exercise of flirting with the idea of, or actually setting up, an NSC. Shouldn't biting not once but twice over 1975--1991 be enough to make one shy? If we have any "culture" that's "strategic", it's agriculture, the backbone of our economy. The author is a free lancer.
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