Carrots instead of sticks for Karzai

Barrister Harun ur Rashid

Photo: AFP

AFGHAN President Hamid Karzai visited Washington from May 10 - 13 for what Obama administration officials described as an opportunity to evaluate the broad strategic partnership between the two countries as they focused on shared security, governance and development goals. Speaking to reporters May 7, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, special assistant to the US President for Afghanistan and Pakistan, said Karzai's visit would come midway between President Obama's December 2009 announcement of his strategy for Afghanistan and its one-year review in December 2010. Lute said it also comes ahead of Karzai's consultative peace jirga at the end of May and his hosting of an international conference in Kabul in July, where he is expected to deliver action plans on his November 2009 inauguration commitments, followed in September by Afghan parliamentary elections and a second round of the US-Afghan strategic dialogue. Karzai's visit "takes place at a very important time," Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes said. Repair of strained relations
The Afghan President's visit has repaired ties in a relationship that seemed to crumble over the course of the year. The US has criticized Karzai for turning a blind eye to corruption and drug trafficking within his government. Karzai, in turn, has accused US officials of failing to give him the support he needs to do his job. The strain worsened when US officials questioned the validity of his re-election. Richard Holbrooke, the US envoy to the region, reportedly stormed out of a meeting with the Afghan leader. Once Karzai felt sufficiently snubbed, he made a public show of "threatening to join the Taliban." During the visit this time, he received a red carpet treatment and a barrage of niceness - a walk through the garden, dinner under chandeliers, extra face time with the President, and glowing reports from the same administration officials who once savagely criticised his leadership. Lt. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry, the Ambassador to Afghanistan, who personally escorted Karzai on the flight from Kabul to Washington, said he had faith in the Afghan President's determination to succeed, a position that stands in contrast to his diplomatic cable last fall. US's new strategy
Operation "Moshtarak" was launched during February in the Taliban-dominated Nad-e-Ali district of central Helmand to break the nexus between the drug trade and the insurgency it funds. After the defeat of Talibans in Marja in Helmand province in February, Afghans and Americans struggled to establish a local government that can win the loyalty of the people to fend off the Talibans. However, Afghan officials rarely show up at work and do little to help local people. Corruption, big and small, remains an overwhelming complaint. Under the circumstances, it is very difficult to depend on loyalty on local people to fight against the Talibans. President Hamid Karzai has no effective control in Kandhahar province because of its hostile political environment. The Pashtun in Kandhahar remain wary of Kabul-Pashtun's domination of the country. The NATO plans to create a ring of stability in the populous districts that surround Kandhahar city by putting troops to restrict Taliban's mobility. These forces, according to a report, will be in place by August and the additional 30,000 US troops will be placed in the surrounding districts. Kandhahar is of the utmost strategic significance to the Afghan government and NATO due to its critical position on Afghanistan's ring road. Furthermore Kandhahar has great economic value from non-poppy agriculture in its fertile river valleys and trade due to linkages with Pakistan's Balochistan province. It is also important to win in Kandhahar because of its symbolic significance as the Taliban's spiritual home. The Taliban will robustly fight to retain its vital ground or it will become irrelevant in southern Afghanistan. The success of the Kandahar offensive may well depend on whether Afghans can overcome their distrust with the Karzai government because President Karzai's brother in Kandhahar who monopolises NATO contracts and other development projects is disliked by large portions of populations. Of greater concern is that the government is not engaging the people by delivering services and combating endemic corruption. The government finds it convenient to run the southern provinces including the Kandhahar province through warlords and druglords and they have carved out political power and economic opportunities. Another recent complicating factor is that up to one third of poppy harvest has been destroyed this spring by mysterious disease, according to the UN officials. In recent weeks Afghan farmers started blaming Americans and NATO militaries for spreading the disease, although the UN officials say the disease has occurred naturally. The US military believes that eradication of poppy plant at this time is counter-productive because they need the loyalty of Afghan people in Kandhahar province. The US and NATO have been sending tens of thousands of new troops into Helmand and Kandahar to wrest control of Taliban strongholds. Karzai believes there are thousands of Taliban members with no ideological basis for fighting his government. He called them "country boys," driven to the insurgency either by Taliban intimidation or by disillusionment with past government failures. The strategy is once the Talibans are beaten in their strongholds, midlevel Taliban leaders are likely to leave the extremist Talbans. Karzai sought US blessing for wider talks with the moderate Talibans when the time comes. President Barack Obama seemed non-committal during a White House news conference with Karzai on 12th May. However, Clinton said on 13th May "And on a personal note, they must respect women's rights." Among the conditions for peace talks, midlevel Taliban leaders would have to renounce violence, cut ties with al-Qaida and its affiliates, and abide by Afghanistan's laws and constitution. Karzai nodded beside her but did not address the women's rights aspect of possible talks with the Taliban. The other conditions apply, he said. Karzai's plans for reconciliation with hardliners, beginning with his upcoming 'peace jirga,' must succeed first." That jirga, scheduled at the end of May, is supposed to bring together some 1,500 Afghan leaders, including leaders of the insurgency, to hash out the terms of a national reconciliation. The plans for national reconciliation are bold, ambitious, and they recognise the limitations of the government's power - and yet there's no guarantee the Taliban will even show up at the jirga. Observers say Afghans know that Americans and European troops will probably pack their bags and leave the country within 18 months, and given this scenario, it is doubtful whether the Afghan government with past tainted record of governance can build trust within that time with the Afghan people. The US wanted the visit to underscore the strategic partnership between the US and Afghanistan and to underscore to Karzai that it's not soldiers but services that count for Afghan people. That means good governance including decentralization of power to provinces is imperative. The question is whether President Karzai will be able to mitigate the grievances of Afghan people by delivering adequate services to them? The author is former Bangladesh Ambassador to the UN, Geneva.