<i>''Pipeline politics: India and Myanmar''</i>
Recent developments in the gas field projects of Myanmar have served to highlight the intense resource diplomacy that is ongoing in the region. The government of Myanmar withdrew India's (under the Gas Authority of India Limited or GAIL) status of "preferential buyer" on the A1 and A3 blocks of its offshore natural gas fields and instead declared their intent to sell the gas to PetroChina. The offshore gas fields of the Shwe project in the Bay of Bengal have estimates of 4.8 trillion cubic feet (TcF) for the current blocks with more exploration ongoing. The controlling interests in the two blocks are Daewoo International (60 percent), O.N.G.C. Videsh Ltd (20 percent), GAIL Ltd (10 percent) and Korea Gas Corporation (10 percent). The most viable of the proposed pipeline routes for moving the gas to India would have proceeded through Myanmar's Arakan state before entering India's Mizoram and Assam provinces and finally terminating in West Bengal at the proposed Jagdishpur-Haldia distribution line. Implications for India
First of all, India has clearly lost an important diplomatic initiative in the attempt to counter Chinese influence in Myanmar. Even after the deal was sweetened with US$20 million in "soft credit" and the proposed construction of a power plant in Myanmar, it would appear that Indian influence was quietly denied by the inevitability of China's international support for Myanmar. Beijing's use of its veto to keep Myanmar's human rights record off of the U.N. Security Council agenda turned out to be more important to the Myanmar junta than the economic incentives. Despite support from pro-India voices within the upper echelon, like that of Vice Senior General Maung Aye, the sharp turn in the sales decision serves to illustrate the depth of the relationship currently enjoyed by China and Myanmar. Maung Aye signalled as much as early as January 2007, when he refused to provide guarantees that India would gain access to the gas. Secondly, the economic implications for India are significant. Recent reductions in the estimates of offshore gas in their own eastern blocks have increased demand to find sources outside of India's borders. The Myanmar fields offered a strong possibility to replace these sources. In particular, the pipeline was destined for the northeastern provinces of India, which are among the most power-starved provinces in the country. If the gas was destined for domestic use, the development-security nexus suggests that the power and resulting development, along with greater cooperation on cross-border counter-insurgency efforts, may have had a strong chance of success in defusing the secessionist movements in the northeastern Indian provinces. Finally, the pipeline seemed set to heighten attempts for greater integration and further military and economic cooperation along the Myanmar-Indian border. Trade initiatives to date have failed to establish in the Indian northeastern border regions, while security initiatives have occurred in a stovepipe fashion with only communication between the two states rather than truly cooperative exercises. India will likely make more overt efforts in the future to establish a stronger presence in the face of Chinese diplomatic successes in Myanmar. It is likely that joint military initiatives in the border region will be initiated and more direct military aid like the proposed light attack helicopter sales from India to Myanmar will continue. Transfers of military equipment have increased significantly in the last two years between India and Myanmar, while joint counter-insurgency operations have been proposed, which would see an unprecedented level of cooperation, and therefore much higher counter-insurgency activity, between the two countries. These efforts would have had a far greater chance of success when combined with the development possibilities that the pipeline may have provided. Implications for Myanmar
First of all, on the diplomatic front, the military junta has signalled where its strength lies. The military government has had a long history of a strong relationship with China which it would not risk in this scenario. It is likely that the junta recognizes the desire for India to play a stronger role in the region, thus giving it a stronger position in its dealings with New Delhi. The resources of Myanmar have allowed it to bypass international sanctions in the past and will now allow it to negotiate with its Asian neighbours in order to win necessary international support and recognition. The risk of angering India to the point of withdrawal of support was minimal; indeed, GAIL was criticized by India's External Affairs Ministry for not pursuing the agreement with a strong enough commitment to see it completed. However, the junta must continue to walk a fine line between alienating neighbours, already suspicious of China's growing influence in the region, undermining its own sovereignty and losing the support of its largest strategic partner, China, by playing it off against other regional interests. Additionally, the recent efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to condemn the slow progress of national reconciliation may have refocused efforts within the junta to place diplomatic pressure via China onto members of ASEAN China has recently been increasing its influence within ASEAN and stands as the more active (between India and China) peripheral player in the ASEAN orbit. Thus, by using its resources as a bargaining chip, Myanmar may have gained promises from China to use its influence to dampen ASEAN members' concerns over the reconciliation process. Secondly, the strength of the Myanmar position lies in the strong economic demand for resources by all of its neighbours. Bids for the sale of the gas were competitive and Myanmar will not lose much in economic terms for the decision to sell to PetroChina. While the decision may be deemed short-sighted for its apparent slight to India's recent diplomatic advances, it does little to reduce the reality that India, Thailand and China are all in need of dependable energy in order to pursue economic development. Another facet of this agreement is a proposed oil pipeline that would be built in conjunction with the necessary gas pipeline. This oil pipeline would be constructed by PetroChina as an alternate route to the Malacca Strait. Its origin would be at a deep water port at Ramree Island in Myanmar, built to accommodate large crude tanker ships, and would cross the country to an undisclosed point on the Chinese/Myanmar border (likely the Muse/Ruli border crossing point). The economic advantage for Myanmar would be an additional sale point for their onshore and offshore oil blocks along with the economic spin off of a major trans-shipment point. China's vulnerability inherent in the reliance on the Malacca Strait may well have driven the junta's decision to rescind India's preferential buyer status. The recent price hikes in domestic fuel that sparked protest in Yangon and resulted in the arrest of a number of former student leaders from the 1988 uprising demonstrates the thin line of economic vulnerability upon which the junta balances. The 1988 uprising that resulted in the current suspended constitution was also sparked by a troubled economy. The junta will need to balance its need for foreign currency, gained through resource rents, with the demands of a population that has not accrued much benefit from the current junta's economic policy. Much of the gas being exported to date and in the future would, arguably, be better used in domestic power generation -- something that the Indian offer would have included. Third, on the security front, agreements that have been developing alongside the gas sale agreement with India will likely not be disturbed by the decision to sell to China. The pipeline route from Shwe would have brought fewer security implications for Myanmar than for India. However, pipeline construction to the western region of Myanmar would have brought with it a larger military presence in an area of poor infrastructure on both sides of the border. In this sense, the military opportunity cost may have been a considerable chance to improve infrastructure and access to an area that has been historically inaccessible. In addition, Myanmar military ties to the considerable narcotics and arms trade that utilizes the porous border between the two countries may have produced a conflict of interest between parties within the junta that forced the withdrawal of the pipeline project. Conclusion
The junta is insisting that the rules of the gas fields have little to do with political decisions; rather, that it is the business as usual approach of offering the sale to the highest bidder. The decision to sell to PetroChina, however, emphasizes the complexity of resource diplomacy for all players within the region. India's current loss in the field of energy security will likely not lead to a decrease in its attempts to win greater cooperation from Myanmar over counter-insurgency efforts, but it does reveal the deep connections between China and Myanmar. This relationship will prove hard for India to compete with in the long run, especially as long as the decision-making process within the junta follows the familiar route of political considerations at the expense of sound domestic economic policy. An important consideration, unexamined here, is that India will not likely rock the diplomatic boat as long as its companies continue to enjoy privileged access to a country that is closed to U.S. and European competition. Exploration, after all, is still ongoing in the offshore blocks while Myanmar's onshore basins remain largely untapped. Courtesy: PINR
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