Change of military strategy in Afghanistan
As part of a strategy shift American troops are being re-deployed to major populated areas. Photo: David Furst/afp
IT has been reported on 22nd September that the top General in charge of NATO forces in Afghanistan US General Stanley McChrystal has ordered his forces out of sparsely populated areas where American troops have fought bloody battles with the Talibans for several years and is redeploying them to protect major Afghan population centres. The strategy shift which amounts to a retreat from some areas, has drawn resistance from some Afghan officials who worry that any pull-back from Taliban-held territory will make the weak Afghan government even more powerless in the eyes of the people. Some US officials told the media that the moves were driven by the realisation that some remote regions of Afghanistan, particularly, in the Hindu Kush mountains, that range through the northeast were not going to be brought under government control anytime soon. The changes are in line with General McChrystal's confidential assessment of the war, leaked to the media, which urges US and NATO forces to "initially focus on critical high population areas that are contested or controlled by insurgents." His assessment warns that the US led NATO coalition risks losing the war unless there are fundamental changes in strategy, including the addition of 10,000 to 40,000 American troops. (60,000 US troops are already in Afghanistan) But it has been reported that Pentagon told the General to delay his request for more troops amid signs of the Obama administration which shows that it is rethinking its strategy for combating a resurgent Taliban. The administration's call for a review which could take weeks comes at a time when the congressional and public support for the war is flagging. But General McChrystal warns if the Taliban insurgency's momentum is not reversed, defeating it may no longer be possible. The General's call for more troops appears to be increasingly at odds with recent comments from President Obama who has insisted in recent days he would not be rushed into approving more US troops for the war. Among the alternatives being presented to Obama is Vice-President's suggestion to revamp the strategy altogether and instead of increasing troops, Biden has proposed scaling back the overall US military presence. Rather than protect the Afghan population from the Taliban, American forces would concentrate on strikes against Al-Qaeda cells using special weapons such as predator missile attacks and other surgical tactics. Since Obama announced his war strategy in March, the political situation in both the US and Afghanistan has muddied. The 20th August election of Afghan Presidency which the administration had hoped would lend new legitimacy to the beleaguered government of Karzai has been mired in accusations of scandal that may not be resolved for months. The allegedly rigged election has disappointed the Western powers. They are in a bind in the sense they cannot leave Afghanistan for the Talibans and at the same time cannot continue the war for a long time in that country. Some White House officials believe that this inherited war should not be saddled with Obama's 2012 re-election bid. Many observers have compared this war for President Obama with that of Vietnam War confronted by President Lyndon Johnson. In addition, US and allied casualties have skyrocketed to record levels. In the third week of September six Italian soldiers were killed in a roadside bombing in Kabul. Demands for withdrawal of Italian troops became louder as Italy has lost 2800 soldiers already. Chancellor Merkel could be forced to pull German troops (4,500) out if she forms another grand coalition with the left or right parties. What are the reasons for the resurgence of the Taleban in Afghanistan? There are many reasons but some of them deserve to be mentioned below. First, Afghanistan is more complex than Iraq socially and ethnically. There are many ethnic groups in the country that do not see eye to eye to each other. Then there are the Sunnis (85%) and the Shias (15%) who dislike each other. The major ethnic groups are Pashtun, Tajik and Uzbeks. The Pashtun tribe straddles across in Pakistan and at one stage the Pashtuns wanted a separate country, neither with Afghanistan nor with Pakistan. Pashto and Persian (Dari) are the two official languages of the country. Persian is spoken by at least half of the population and serves as a lingua franca for most. Pashto is spoken widely in the south, east and south west. Uzbek and Turkmen are spoken in the north. Smaller groups throughout the country also speak more than 70 other languages and numerous dialects. Second, Afghanistan can be considered a country of minorities as there are no groups serving as a majority. Rather, Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group followed by Tajiks as the second largest group. The Hazaras and the Uzbeks are tied for third, followed by the Aimak, Turkmen, Baluch, Nuristani and other small groups. Third, the Durand Line (2,640 kilometres) between Afghanistan and Pakistan was a British creation. It was demarcated and then signed into a treaty on November 12, 1893 between the ruler of Afghanistan, Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, and Sir Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary of what was then British India. Kabul rejects the Durand Line as the boundary was imposed arbitrarily by the British rulers between Afghanistan and British India. This is where the United States and its NATO allies are battling the Taliban and there is the possibility of military defeat. Fourth, the tribal areas on both sides of the Durand Line have always been autonomous. Anxious to safeguard this autonomy, the tribes resist control by the central government, whether in Islamabad or Kabul. For centuries, their overriding impulse has been to protect their Muslim religion and their traditional way of life from foreign interference. Of all the challenges NATO troops will face the ongoing war across the Afghan-Pakistan border that has been the most difficult and dangerous. Fifth, the traditional role of the tribal leaders in the country has broken down. Unless its role is restored, peace in the locality will be difficult to maintain. Neither the Afghan government nor the NATO troops have been able to engage the tribal leaders in the fight against Islamic militants. Rather the tribal people are angered by the death of innocent civilians including women and children in the tribal belt by US missiles. Sixth, the climate is both hot and cold in Afghanistan. Instead of open expanses of desert as in Iraq, much of Afghanistan is made of grim mountain fortresses. Its population is far less literate and much poorer. The economy is the reverse of Iraqbig on agriculture, light on industry and no oil. The illicit drug trade is lucrative, which earns about US$40 billion dollars that remain with warlords and some of it reaches the Taliban. Seventh, seven years into the conflict, the US administration realises that the proposed strength of the Afghan National Army - 85,000 - is only half of what is required. After spending US$16 billion on military and police training since 2002, only two out of 105 Afghan army units and none of police units were assessed as fully capable of conducting counter-insurgency action. Finally, rampant corruption is a big problem in the country. It is the problem of inefficient government machinery. President Karzai conceded that "It is a problem of so much money coming to this country." Foreign forces may have taken the sting out of the Taliban for a while but that it would be unrealistic and probably incredible to think that the multinational forces in Afghanistan could rid the country of insurgents, unless Afghanistan government can run its administration in unity and with legitimacy. Whatever the truth of the matter, in the long run, it's not soldiers but services that count - electricity, water, food, health care, justice, and jobs. Had the Afghan government delivered the promised services on time, while employing Afghans to rebuild their own country according to their own priorities and under the supervision of their own government, they would now be in charge of their own defence. The forces on the other side, which we loosely call the Taliban, would also have lost much of their grounds for complaint. The author is former Bangladesh Ambassador to the UN, Geneva.
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